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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Securitization 
Adi Mordel 
 
 
 
Off-balance sheet financings and securitization in particular, are viewed by many 
as the culprits of the 2007 financial meltdown. In a securitization transaction, assets are 
sold to a special purpose entity that finances the acquisition by issuing debt securities at 
various seniority levels to investors. In theory, the transaction relies crucially on the 
assumption that the risks of owning the assets are truly separated from the securitizer and 
reside with investors. However, in reality financial institutions take advantage of 
accounting rules, regulatory capital requirements, and supervisors’ indecisive actions and 
create a plethora of asset-backed securities (ABS) that do not completely remove the 
risks of owning the assets.  
In my dissertation I show that securitizations negatively affect their parents, that 
investors do not consider ABS-deals separately from their sponsors, and that these 
transactions are more akin to financings than sales. Furthermore, I document that 
securitizers of downgraded ABS-deals face significant market discipline, as investors 
clearly understand the relation between ABS sponsors and their off-balance sheet deals. 
In addition, I find that internal control mechanisms mitigate some of the negative effects 
associated with securitization.  
In light of the ongoing debt on the future of financial intermediation in general 
and securitization in particular, my dissertation offers a unique perspective on some of 
the contested issues. First, transparent reporting requirements should focus on the level of 
 ix 
retained risk and translate into on-balance sheet capital requirements. Second, ABS 
downgrades can serve as a valuable signal to regulators and allow them to link both on- 
and off-balance sheet conditions in the supervisory process. And finally, efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms can complement the supervisory process and attenuate 
the risks associated with securitization.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Securitization, the process by which non-tradable assets are transformed into 
liquid securities via cash-flow repackaging, is classified by both accounting and 
regulatory rules as a “sale” of assets, therefore allowing the issuer to remove the assets 
from its books. This “off-balance sheet” treatment relies crucially on the concept of 
“true” sale, such that the assets are bankruptcy remote from the parent/securitizer. 
However, I document that this concept is violated and that according to investors these 
assets are not really separated from their parents. The transaction, which resembles secure 
borrowing, adversely affects the parent, and since the typical securitizer is a bank, the 
role of regulators and their ability to mitigate those effects are questioned.  
My dissertation also highlights the existence of market discipline, triggered by an 
asset-backed security (ABS) downgrade, and its importance in complementing the 
regulatory process. An ABS downgrade signals potential problems and allows regulators 
to incorporate both on-and off-balance sheet positions within the supervisory framework. 
Finally, my dissertation emphasizes the importance of having proper internal control 
mechanisms in dealing with the aftermath of securitization. Effective corporate 
governance not only facilitates the supervisory process but also limits securitizer’s risk 
and enhances firm value.  
 
1.  Securitization, Sale or Financing? 
 
  
2 
My first essay titled “Asset Sales, Recourse, and Investors’ Reactions to Initial 
Securitizations: Evidence why Off-balance Sheet Accounting Treatment does not 
Remove On-balance Sheet Financial Risk” (Higgins, Mason, and Mordel, 2009a) 
addresses the validity of both regulatory and accounting classification of securitization as 
a sale transaction, and provides empirical evidence against such treatment.  
Securitization is based on the concept of a “true” sale. As originally envisaged 
under FASB140, the sale leaves no remaining link to the sponsor (or seller) whether 
through the possibility that the assets will be repurchased or guaranteed or that they will 
be available to general creditors of the firm in bankruptcy.  
In practice, however, securitizations closely resemble typical firm financing 
arrangements. In the real world, sponsors of securitized assets maintain representations 
and warranties, servicing contracts, and repeated reliance on a relatively small market of 
buyers for future securitizations (monopsonistic qualities in a repeated game) that 
continually link buyer and seller, possibly precluding the sort of true sale originally 
envisaged under FASB140. Under such scenario, securitizations should be classified as 
financings. In a financing, the assets do not leave the firm’s books so the transaction is 
exclusively on-balance sheet. Important covenants related to the financing are disclosed 
and the assets used in the financing are always at risk of consolidation into the general 
estate by bankruptcy judges.  
Both accounting and regulatory treatments classify securitizations as a sale of 
assets, allowing the issuer to remove the assets from its books and receive off-balance 
sheet treatment. But the debate continues regarding whether securitizations are sales or 
financings, and more fundamentally, whether they should be carried on- or off-balance 
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sheet. One way to distinguish whether securitizations are sales or financings from a 
financial-economics perspective is to examine how investors in the sponsor firm, 
themselves, react to securitizations. In such an exercise, the most important information 
about investors’ reactions lies in their reactions to firms’ first securitization 
announcements – follow-on transactions would confer little additional information.  
This paper analyzes such investors’ reactions. The systematic negative short-term 
equity returns and negative long-term operating performance following securitization are 
evidence that securitizations are viewed by investors in the sponsor firms as more similar 
to financings than sales. Additional analysis shows that securitization is also associated 
with increased systematic risk at sponsor firms, suggesting that the rapid firm growth 
fueled by securitization is similar to taking on substantial additional leverage. The results 
are strongest for banks, suggesting that regulatory capital arbitrage may create the 
incentive for greater leverage, and therefore greater increases in risk. Again, such results 
suggest for banks and non-banks alike, securitization is more akin to a financing than a 
sale. 
The findings have implications for accounting and regulatory recognition of 
securitizations. While it is easy to argue that securitizations are not true asset sales, it is 
more difficult to argue how they should be correctly accounted for on firm balance 
sheets. If expected loss remains on balance sheet through residual interests, firm capital 
should not be reduced significantly compared to on-balance sheet treatment. On the other 
hand, if firms can justify some risk transfer, i.e., of unexpected loss, they should be 
awarded capital relief by investors and regulators alike.  
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2.  The Role of Market Discipline  
 
The second essay of the dissertation titled “The Information Content of Asset 
Backed Securities Downgrades and The Motivation behind Them” (Higgins, Mason, 
Mordel, 2009b) provides additional evidence against the bankruptcy remoteness of off-
balance sheet assets.  
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have played an important role in the development 
of the securitization market.1 Their intimate involvement in the financial engineering of 
ABS deals, coupled with investors’ requirement of a rating agency “approval” affected 
the marketability of the issued securities, and along the way made CRAs look more like 
underwriters than passive, credit-quality opinion providers (Mason and Rosner, 2007b). 
The opacity and complexity of the various instruments contributed to CRAs status as the 
de facto regulators of that market, and   
 There is no doubt that securitization transformed financial intermediation. Banks 
could obtain cheaper funding, improve balance sheet management, and focus on activities 
in which they posses a comparative advantage.2 Yet these benefits seem negligible in 
light of the 2007 panic, which was driven by the tremendous performance deterioration 
and the massive downgrades of numerous ABS deals. Voices criticizing securitization 
point out that it increases systemic risk in the financial system, due to banks’ habit of 
retaining the equity portion of securitized deals, without having the adequate capital 
                                                 
1
 On the role of rating agencies see also Committee of Global Financial System (2005), and Lucchetti and 
Ng (2007). 
2
 On the mechanisms and benefits of securitization, see Gorton and Souleles (2006), and Greenbaum and 
Thakor (2007). Calomiris and Mason (2004) provide evidence on the how securitization fosters efficient 
contracting. 
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levels on-balance sheet to support it. 3  In addition, CRAs have also been criticized, 
particularly regarding their inability to measure risk and appropriately rate the issued 
securities. 
The negative sentiment on securitization raises important questions about markets 
functionality, discipline, and the CRAs’ downgrade motivation. To summarize our 
results, we show that the market reaction to an ABS downgrade is significantly negative, 
indicating that investors do not treat the deal independently from the ultimate parent, and 
that the securitization’s underlying “true sale” assumption was indeed violated. The most 
negative announcement returns are for downgraded ABS deals sponsored by troubled 
financial institutions (FIs), suggesting that investors are aware of sponsors’ ability to 
support poorly performing deals through implicit recourse. In addition, market discipline 
is not limited to a loss of market share. Ultimate parents of downgraded deals experience 
significant delays in their ABS issuance cycles post downgrade, suggesting that an 
originator’s ability to securitize depends on its credit quality. Such delays are not 
observed for “good” securitizers, those sponsors of ABS deals that did not suffer 
downgrades.  
In light of the ongoing market turmoil that was driven by a myriad of complex 
securities (Gorton, 2008) and the numerous calls for comprehensive regulatory reforms, 
our results emphasize that markets were functioning even before the first signs of the 
upcoming panic in the summer of 2007. Investors incorporated new information promptly 
into a securitizer’s stock price, and accurately understood changes in its condition as the 
securitizer’s ability to issue ABS deals post-downgrade was sensitive to its credit quality. 
                                                 
3
 Moreover, since under certain conditions banks are required to absorb the losses generated by their failed 
ABS deals, critiques question the transactions’ ability to truly separate assets from the originator and 
relocate risk (Stiglitz, 2008; Krugman, 2008). 
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Since an ABS downgrade provides valuable information on a securitizer’s relation with 
its off-balance sheet deal, and since the downgrade exposes the securitizer to the market’s 
disciplinary forces, regulatory reforms should consider incorporating such market signals 
into the supervisory process because any newly generated information can reduce 
uncertainty about a securitizer’s condition, leading to a quicker and effective response by 
supervisors (Flannery, 2001, Caprio, Kunt, and Kane, 2008).  
 With regards to credit rating agencies (CRAs), our results indicate that the 
consideration behind some of the ABS downgrades is not independent of the ultimate 
parent’s financial performance. Downgraded deals sponsored by non-FIs are associated 
with the sponsor’s poor pre-event stock returns and deteriorating operating performance, 
suggesting that CRAs, just like investors, treat ABS deals as an integral part of the 
ultimate parent/sponsor. That is not the case for deals sponsored by FIs. There, CRAs 
tend to downgrade deals irrespective of the sponsor’s pre-event performance, an 
indication of a downgrade driven by deal specific conditions, and potentially greater 
transparency.   
 
3.  Corporate Governance and Securitization 
 
Finally, in my third essay titled “Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from 
Initial Securitization by Bank Holding Companies” (Mordel, 2009), I investigate the 
relation between various governance variables and the decision to securitized, in addition 
to studying whether governance mitigates any of the negative effects associated with off-
balance sheet financing. To address this question, I study the governance mechanisms of 
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the largest most frequent securitizers, bank holding companies (BHCs), just prior to their 
first ever securitization transaction.  
Based on my discussions with industry practitioners, it is assumed that if 
governance plays a role in a BHC’s decision to securitize, then it is most likely to be 
observable when the BHC initiates its securitization program. Once securitization is 
introduced, the BHC would typically issue an ABS deal once every few months, making 
securitization part of its ongoing operation and as a result limiting the board of directors’ 
involvement with successive deals.  
 I compare the governance characteristics of 44 BHCs prior to their first ever 
securitization transactions with those of a matching sample based on industry, size, and 
leverage. I show that securitizers have lower levels of insider stock ownership and that 
controlling for size, risk, and liquidity, BHCs with higher levels of insider ownership are 
less likely to securitize.  
I also find that internal corporate control variables mitigate some of the negative 
effects caused by securitization. I show that post-securitization systematic risk tends to be 
higher for securitizers, yet it is lower for securitizers with higher levels of CEO equity 
based compensation. In addition, implied leverage obtained from the Hamada equation 
(being directly related to the amount securitized) is lower for BHCs with higher levels of 
insider ownership. Finally, post-event firm value (measured by Tobin’s q) is positively 
related to the proportion of outside directors serving on the boards of securitizers. 
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CHAPTER II: ESSAY I 
Asset Sales, Recourse, and Investor Reactions to Initial Securitizations: Evidence 
Why Off-Balance Sheet Accounting Treatment Does Not Remove On-Balance Sheet 
Financial Risk 
Eric J. Higgins, Ph.D. 
Joseph R. Mason, Ph.D. 
Adi Mordel 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Securitization is based on the concept of a “true” sale. As originally envisaged 
under FASB140, the sale leaves no remaining link to the sponsor (or seller) whether 
through the possibility that the assets will be repurchased or guaranteed or that they will 
be available to general creditors of the firm in bankruptcy.  
In practice, however, securitizations closely resemble typical firm financing 
arrangements. In the real world, sponsors of securitized assets maintain representations 
and warranties, servicing contracts, and repeated reliance on a relatively small market of 
buyers for future securitizations (monopsonistic qualities in a repeated game) that 
continually link buyer and seller, possibly precluding the sort of true sale originally 
envisaged under FASB140. Even the most fundamental concept of the “bankruptcy 
remoteness” principal by which the buyer has full title to the collateral has fared poorly 
before bankruptcy courts and now stands on the verge of being ruled irrelevant. In a 
financing, the assets do not leave the firm’s books so the transaction is exclusively on-
balance sheet. Important covenants related to the financing are disclosed and the assets 
used in the financing are always at risk of consolidation into the general estate by 
bankruptcy judges.  
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Both accounting and regulatory treatments classify securitizations as a sale of 
assets, allowing the issuer to remove the assets from their books and receive off-balance 
sheet treatment. But the debate continues regarding whether securitizations are sales or 
financings, and more fundamentally, whether they should be carried on- or off-balance 
sheet.  
One way to distinguish whether securitizations are sales of financings from a 
financial-economics perspective is to examine how investors in the sponsor firm, 
themselves, react to securitizations. In such an exercise, the most important information 
about investor reactions lies in investor reactions to firms’ first securitization 
announcements – follow-on transactions would confer little additional information.  
The work that follows analyzes such investor reactions. The systematic negative 
short-term equity returns and negative long-term operating performance following 
securitization are classic evidence that securitizations are viewed by investors in the 
sponsor firms as more similar to financings than sales. Additional analysis shows that 
securitization is also associated with increased systematic risk at sponsor firms, 
suggesting that the rapid firm growth fueled by securitization is similar to taking on 
substantial additional leverage. Such results are again consistent with classifying 
securitizations as financings rather than sales, despite accounting and regulatory 
classifications to the contrary and off-balance sheet treatment.  
The remainder of this paper first describes the kinds of recourse activities and 
bankruptcy events that have led analysts and policymakers to question the classification 
of securitizations as sales, rather than financings. Next, the paper shows how financings 
and sales differ, and why investors and regulators should therefore be concerned with 
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whether securitizations are sales of financings. The next section introduces out data 
sources and data construction, followed by empirical results. The final section 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.  Risk Transfer and Securitization  
 
Early securitizations were limited by REMIC tax laws that maintained a strict 
boundary between the seller and the assets securitized. But as securitization was applied 
beyond Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conforming mortgages to other assets like lease 
receivables, automobile loans, credit cards, and second-lien and non-conforming 
(subprime and Alt-A) first-lien mortgages in the early 2000s, those boundaries were 
relaxed significantly.  
Some of the first relaxations came about in the credit card sector, which until 
2004 was still the largest sector of securitizations outside of conforming mortgages. 
According to Higgins and Mason (2004), “…many loan sales (particularly those 
involving revolving collateral such as credit card loans) hinge upon an implicit 
understanding that recourse may be provided by the sponsor. Such understandings exist 
because sponsors wish to maintain their reputations for consistent credit quality over 
repeated sales (while still taking advantage of the ability, under a true sale, to remove the 
assets from the balance sheet).” (Higgins and Mason 2004, p. 858)  
The 17 discrete recourse events examined by Higgins and Mason (2004) 
supported 10 different credit-card banks and propped up 89 domestic and three foreign 
securities issues with a combined value of about $35.5 billion, comprising almost 7.5% of 
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the $475 billion total public credit card asset-backed security domestic issuance reported 
on the Securities Data Corporation’s New Issues Database through May 2002, the ending 
date of the study. All Higgins and Mason’s (2004) events violate the true sale provision 
of GAAP and RAP, yet none of the events resulted in regulatory or accounting 
restatements that added loans back onto bank balance sheets as (supposedly) required 
under accounting and regulatory provisions. 
The discreet recourse events in Higgins and Mason (2004) led analysts to question 
recourse practices as early as the mid-1990s. Lawrence Cohn, a Senior Vice President of 
Equity Research at PaineWebber, wrote that PaineWebber had already been of the 
opinion that: 
…securitizations are financing mechanisms rather than bona fide sales of 
assets… Clearly the risks of ownership have not passed to buyers of 
securitized paper. In theory, every securitization is supposed to stand on its 
own….In fact, if buyers and sellers miscalculate, the seller has always made 
up the difference rather than expose the buyers to risk. Thus the putative seller 
in fact passes on none of the risks of ownership. We don’t know how long the 
fiction of sales treatment will last. (“Will Sales Treatment Survive a 
Recession?” 1997, p. 1) 
 
The lack of risk transfer soon led to pressure for treating securitizations as 
financings in bankruptcy courts. On December 29, 2000, LTV Steel Corporation and its 
operating subsidiaries (LTV) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 and 
requested the court allow LTV to use the cash generated from two of LTV’s 
securitizations in order to stay in business. In support of its motion, LTV itself argued 
that the asset transfers in fact had been disguised financings and thus remained in its 
bankruptcy estate, thereby challenging the “bankruptcy remoteness” of its own 
securitizations. (Nomura 2002, p. 23)  
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The court issued an interim order on the same day as LTV’s bankruptcy filing, 
granting LTV’s motion for the use of cash collateral – the securitizations – and marking a 
later date on its calendar for a final determination of whether the asset transfers had been 
true sales or secured financings (Moody’s 2001, p. 6). The Judge was loath to accept 
arguments that the securitized assets had truly been sold to the securitized pools. 
According to the Judge’s follow-up Memorandum Opinion of February 5, 2001: 
[T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that Debtor does not 
retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim 
order. Debtor’s business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various 
metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in 
products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be 
derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory 
and receivables, and that this interest is sufficient to support the entry of the 
interim cash collateral order (Memorandum Opinion). 
 
Even in its February 5 Opinion, however, the court did not make a determination 
that a true sale had or had not occurred. (Moody’s 2001, p. 7) For better or worse, the 
controversy was settled without any judicial resolution of the issues. LTV withdrew its 
attack when the securitization investors agreed to supply replacement financing through 
another debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan. In essence, the securitization investors 
experienced a forced exchange of their securitization paper for DIP paper. (Nomura 2002, 
p. 23) Bankruptcy courts, therefore, have never ruled on the issue of true sale. Even 
regulators have left the issue open. In 2002, the FDIC announced only that they “may or 
may not” seize securitized pool assets in the event of a bank failure, which remains the 
policy stance today.  
Without clear judicial or regulatory guidance, recourse became instituted in a 
more continuous fashion in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Most recently, recourse was 
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extended so that very little risk left sellers’ balance sheets through securitization. By 
2004, regulators memorialized continuous recourse in regulatory rules, explicitly moving 
away from requiring a transfer of a “majority” of risk to merely requiring a transfer of 
“some” of the risk (See, for instance, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2003, p. 7). Regulatory rules allowing 
recourse for “operational issues,” like failing to adhere to a homogenous set of 
underwriting standards, set the stage for the willful confounding of operational and credit 
risk and the present crisis when a preponderance of defaulted loans could be put back to 
the seller on the basis of subjectively-defined operational criteria. (See, for instance, 
comments from FannieMae and FreddieMac in Marra 2000 and Golding 2000) 
Recourse is a continuing issue in today’s market meltdown. On April 30, 2009, 
Advanta Corp. announced that it expects its credit card securitizations to enter early 
amortization despite the availability of “…tools at its disposal which the company 
believes will prevent early amortization if used.”4 According to Fitch, such tools could 
include “…charge-off sales, a yield supplement account, or receivable discounting, as 
seen recently at other large card issuers, 5 all of which have been identified by bank 
regulators as recourse events that should result in the consolidation of securitizations on-
balance sheet.  
Even the bankruptcy-remoteness conditions are being tested. On May 14, 2009, 
General Growth Properties Inc., a mall developer, filed the biggest real-estate bankruptcy 
in U.S. history to date and won court approval of a $400 million debtor-in-possession 
loan collateralized by its securitizations. Like LTV, General Growth sought (and this 
                                                 
4
 Advanta Corp 8-K filing, May 1, 2009. 
5
 Business Wire, April 30, 2009. 
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time, won) court approval to use malls that it had securitized as cash collateral for a 
debtor-in-possession loan facility over objections from investors in the securitizations.  
The investors in the securitizations argued that many of General Growth’s malls 
shouldn’t be in bankruptcy at all and the parent company shouldn’t have access to those 
properties’ cash flow. In an amicus brief filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New 
York on May 1, trade groups representing the commercial real-estate industry said 
allowing General Growth to include the special-purpose entities in its filing could set a 
dangerous precedent for securitization markets by calling into question the protection of 
the assets from other creditors – that is, calling into question true sale. As with LTV, 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market participants thereby view the 
court’s decision as a threat to sales treatment. 
The non-contractual nature of recourse means that implicit recourse is just that: 
implicit. There are no contractual terms dictating that recourse will be provided nor can 
there be, or the securitization will never be allowed off-balance sheet in the first place! 
Furthermore, there also remains no guarantee that collateral rights transferred via sales 
treatment will survive bankruptcy. In short, securitization is often a “sale” with little risk 
transfer away from the seller or bankruptcy-remoteness. If risk is not transferred, 
however, securitization is really just a disguised financing.  
The rest of this paper investigates the financial economic nature of securitizations 
inferred from sponsor firm investor reactions to embarking upon such a strategy. The 
empirical evidence suggests investors in the sponsor firms view securitizations more like 
financings than sales, confirming the conjectural view of the lack of risk transfer and 
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bankruptcy-remoteness and calling into question accounting policies that maintain off-
balance sheet treatment.  
 
3.  Literature Review 
 
The classical literature on asset sales and financings is that of Lang, Poulsen, and 
Stulz (1995) and Kose and Ofek (1995), as well as that of Hite, Owers, and Rogers 
(1987). Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) introduce the difference between asset sales and 
financings. According to Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) asset sales benefit investors 
because they allow the firm to obtain funds unfettered by additional investors who could 
attempt to jump the creditor queue in financial distress situations. Financings increase 
leverage more directly while exposing investors to the risk of appropriation.  
The common view of securitization, therefore, is that securitization is thought to 
benefit firm financing costs by replacing a contractual hypothecation of assets with a 
complete legal sale into a bankruptcy remote structure. That way, general creditors have 
no possibility of seizing assets in the event of default or bankruptcy (Gorton and Souleles 
2007). Securitization also lowers financing costs for the firm because the structure of 
securities used to finance the loans are rated based on the financial engineering rather 
than the underlying asset creditworthiness or the firm’s own credit rating. Kose and Ofek 
(1995) illustrate similar benefits of asset sales in divestiture announcements. Hite, Owers, 
and Rogers (1987) postulate that operating asset sales promote efficiency by allocating 
assets to better uses. The analog to financial firms is selling assets with servicing rights 
attached.  
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Securitization is also thought to benefit firms, particularly, depository institutions, 
by reducing reserve and capital requirements (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). Banks can 
also securitize long-term assets (such as mortgages), move them off-balance-sheet, and 
shorten the average maturity of their assets. Last, securitization enables firms to focus on 
activities in which they have comparative advantages such as originating, servicing, and 
monitoring.  
Theoretical work focusing on information asymmetry reaches different 
conclusions. For instance, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) introduce a model dealing with 
bank funding modes. Their initial assumption is that loans are funded either through 
emitting deposits (DFM) or selling the loans to investors (SFM). Due to asymmetric 
information relating to loan quality6, SFM emerges as a superior way of resolving the 
borrower/investor conflict. Under DFM, depositors and banks incur screening costs 
which are born by the borrowers, while under SFM borrowers are permitted to partially 
insure their credit.7 The choice of insurance coverage signals borrower’s quality, and 
those of higher quality will choose higher levels of insurance because the interest on their 
loans will be lower. The important conclusion is that with an appropriately underpriced 
deposit insurance and asymmetric information, the best assets are securitized while the 
worst ones are funded with deposits, because banks liabilities can be transferred to the 
FDIC. Note that while this result is contrary to the media coverage of the credit crisis, it 
is largely correct.  
Follow-on work by Instefjord (2005), Krahnen and Wilde (2006), Franke and 
Krahnen (2005), and Hansel and Krahnen (2007) shows that since banks in their models 
                                                 
6
 The common assumption is that borrowers posses private information not available to depositors, hence a 
natural conflict emerges. 
7
 For instance, by purchasing a letter of credit, borrowers can lower screening costs for investors. 
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retain the first-loss piece of securitizations, banks retain the expected default losses and 
only sell the unexpected losses. 
Instefjord (2005) shows how such arrangements can destabilize the banking sector 
because of incomplete risk transfer (in this case, from credit derivatives use). Krahnen 
and Wilde (2006) model the potential risk transfer from a bank’s balance sheet through 
the use of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which replaced securitized residual and 
mezzanine debt holdings at US banks after 2002, when US banks were taxed on such 
arrangements with 100% capitalization of residual pieces and other remaining risky 
pieces of securitizations on their books. Franke and Krahnen (2005) show empirically 
that the lack of risk transfer corresponds with an increase in the bank’s beta, while Hansel 
and Krahnen (2007) conclude that increase in equity beta is more significant if the issuing 
bank is financially weak. 
Of course, incomplete risk transfer has the same economic effect as replacing a 
sale with a financing, as per the classical literature above, but masking the condition can 
disrupt market flow when the terms of the deals are unilaterally altered, such as when 
non-contractual recourse support is withdrawn.  
 
4.  Data 
 
Our initial sample is all available securitization transactions from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database from 1970-2002. The SDC data base includes deal 
specific data such as issuer/entity, ultimate parent, amount being securitized, underlying 
asset, type of security issued, underwriter/book runner, deal ratings and issuance date. We 
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omit issues associated with ADRs, REITs, SBIs, and closed-end funds. We also omit 
issues that are classified as CDO’s.  
Our ultimate goal is to identify the first securitization transaction made by each 
unique issuing company in the SDC database. The identification of the first securitization 
transaction made by each unique issuer is crucial to our analysis. By identifying the first 
securitization transaction, we are able to isolate the market’s reaction to the “new” event 
of securitization for each issuer, allowing us decompose whether the market is 
associating securitization with financing or leverage. Also examining the first 
securitization should allow the specific financial and market changes that take place as 
firms begin the securitization process to be identified. Since subsequent securitizations 
are likely to be continuations of the issuing firms’ initial funding strategies, they are not 
likely to be informative.  
Each transaction in the SDC database is primarily identified by its issuer. The 
issuer, however, is in most cases not the ultimate parent company but a bankruptcy-
remote intermediate trust subsidiary created by the ultimate parent company.8  
SDC provides information on the ultimate parent of each issuer but this 
information is not always complete. In some instances, the information is just missing. In 
other cases, the information refers to a publicly-traded parent subsidiary which must be 
tracked down and linked with the publicly-traded parent. In yet other instances, merger 
activity affects the meaningfulness of the first recorded securitization. For example, 
consider the takeover of First Republic Bank of Dallas by Bank of America (BOA) in 
1988. If First Republic securitized for the first time following that merger, we discard the 
                                                 
8
 Tax law dictates that securitized assets must be doubly-sold to sufficiently remove them from the sponsor 
firm and achieve bankruptcy remoteness sufficient to justify off-balance sheet treatment. Despite such 
provisions, relevant de facto bankruptcy treatment is covered above.  
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observation since BOA, which is the ultimate parent, securitized for the first time on 
September 21, 1977.  
Once we have identified the first securitization transaction made by each unique 
ultimate parent company we then check the issuing firm’s data availability on CRSP and 
Compustat. Many of the sponsor firms in the SDC database are firms that do not trade 
publicly. SDC provides data fields for stock exchange of the ultimate parent, the ticker 
symbol of the ultimate parent, and the CUSIP of the ultimate parent. Observations that 
have valid entries for stock exchange and ticker are included in our data. Observations 
that only have CUSIP available are screened through the CRSP database to see if they 
have at some point in time been publicly traded. Those that are found on CRSP are 
included in our data. Those observations without CUSIPS, tickers, and stock exchanges 
are excluded from the sample.  
Having identified those observations to be included in our data set, we search 
CRSP and Compustat for valid data for each observation. Observations that have no data 
available from either CRSP or Compustat on the observed first issuance date are 
excluded. 
To ensure that we have identified the first securitization and to identify the actual 
announcement of the first securitization, all events in the final data set are double-
checked on Factiva. We search for the earliest news story relating to securitization around 
the SDC issuance date for each issuing company. The date of the earliest news story is 
used as the announcement date for the securitization. We also search prior to the issue 
date for any news stories that contain words such as securitization and asset-backed to 
ensure that there were no prior securitizations that did not show up on the SDC data base. 
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We did not find any observations where there was a securitization related news story 
prior to the first identified issuance on SDC. If no news stories at all are found, the SDC 
issuance date is used as the announcement date. 
Finally, we identify an issuer as a bank if its first 2-digit SIC code is 60, and 
discard any bank that was insolvent prior to the first securitization or failed within the 
time period of 1989-1995, as these transactions might be RTC related. Our final sample 
has 119 observations.9  
Table 1 contains summary statistics related to our final sample. Panel A of Table 
1 introduces several facts regarding our sample. A typical firm that securitizes for the 
first time is large, with a median market capitalization just shy of $1 billion. The 
Compustat mean (median) size decile of our securitizers is 8 (9), and roughly 60% of our 
sample belongs to either decile 9 or 10.10  
In addition, the first transaction appears to be an economically significant event, 
the average deal size being 71% of firm’s market value of equity (13% in terms of asset 
size). The descriptive statistics for our sub-samples are reported in Panels B and C of 
Table 1. Banks tend to be larger than non-banks in terms of asset size, yet their market 
capitalization is smaller. Furthermore, the average deal accounts for 93% of the banks 
market value of equity (7.15% of asset size), and 51% of non-banks market value of 
                                                 
9
 While one might think that extending the sample beyond the end of 2002 might improve the sample size, 
there is not much to be had by doing so. First, there are vastly fewer initial securitizations after 2002 
because the industry is already well-established. Second, after 2002, firms – especially banks – began 
securitizing and re-securitizing residual interests in ways that are even less transparent than previously. 
Even is one might hypothesize there exists a structural shift in the effects of securitization after 2002, there 
are too few observations upon which to estimate meaningful results and the investigation lies beyond the 
scope of the present topic. 
10
 Size deciles are based on Compustat firms that report market value of equity one year prior to the 
transaction, where decile 10 is the largest and decile 1 the smallest.  
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equity (18% of asset size). In general, the sample’s descriptive statistics support the view 
that securitization is associated with large firms that securitize substantial amounts.  
The deal distribution by industry is presented in Panel D of Table 1. Depository 
institutions are by far the most frequent first-time securitizers, accounting for over 46% 
of the sample. Non-depository credit institutions, those that engage in extending credit in 
the form of loans but do not offer deposit banking, are the second most frequent 
securitizers (10%), with utilities such as electric and gas being third (8%). 
 
5.  Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Securitization 
 
5.1.  Short term market reaction 
 
To investigate the short term effect of securitization, we conduct an event study 
around the date on which firms announce their first transaction. The market model is used 
to estimate market model parameters for an event window of (-1, 1), with the CRSP 
value-weighted return as the market return. The estimation period runs for 200 days, and 
ends 11 days before the announcement. We use Factiva to make sure that there are no 
confounding events during the time of the announcement. From Table 2 we observe that 
the market reaction for the full sample is negative, but not statistically significant.11 
Banks that securitize for the first time, however, experience on average a statistically 
significant decrease in shareholder’s wealth of 0.75% over the period (-1, 1).12 The short 
                                                 
11
 The sample size for the event study is larger (145) because we include all observations with available 
data on CRSP. However, in subsequent analyses we only include observations with data on CRSP and 
Compustat hence the sample size is smaller (118).  
12
 Similar results were obtained with a (0, 1) event window. 
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run market reaction is stronger if we consider the 54 banks with data availability on both 
CRSP and Compustat. For the average bank in the sample, the negative reaction of 0.88% 
(t=-2.07) decreases the market value of equity by almost $14 million over the three-day 
period.13  
 
5.2.  Matching-sample selection 
 
To facilitate the long term market and operating performance analyses, we 
compare the performance of our securitizers with that of matched non-securitizers, 
starting one year before and ending three years after the event (-1, +3). Since banks are 
inherently different from non-banks, we perform a separate matching procedure for each 
group. For the banking group, we match on industry, asset size, and performance, namely 
return on equity. We obtain similar results when we use ROA or market-to-book value of 
equity (MBE) instead of ROE. From the Compustat universe of depository institutions 
(SIC code 60), we choose the peer with the closest sum of absolute percentage 
differences in size and ROE. For our non-bank securitizers, we use all the firms on 
Compustat that are not depository institutions as potential matches. We follow a similar 
procedure as Billet et al (2006). We identify all peers that trade on the same venue 
(NYSE/AMEX vs. NASDAQ) as our issuers, and whose market value of equity falls 
                                                 
13
 While the documented results of a negative market reaction to the banks’ announcement of securitization 
is comparable to Lockwood et al. (1996), their sample’s time period of 1985-1992 is largely dominated by 
RTC transactions that they do not exclude from their data set (see Thomas 1999 for related criticism) and 
their sample includes repeat securitizations, making it difficult to test for any meaningful impact of 
securitization. As noted above, our sample covers a more exhaustive period, 1970-2002, we drop any banks 
that might have been forced to securitize due to RTC resolution, and we consider only the first act 
securitization. 
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within 10% of the issuer’s (at year-end prior to the transaction)14. Finally, we choose the 
peer with the closest sum of absolute percentage differences in size and book-to-market 
value of equity. In addition to identifying a peer matched sample, we also construct an 
industry (2-digit SIC code) adjusted sample in which securitizers are excluded from their 
respective industry starting one year prior to securitization.   
For both procedures, our peers are matched in the fiscal year before the 
transaction (i.e. year -1). We require any peer to show up in our matched sample only 
once, and that the peer did not securitize for up to three years following the matching. If a 
non-issuer is delisted from Compustat while the securitizer is still trading, the second-
best nonissuing firm is added in on a point-forward basis. If the second peer is delisted, 
we continue with the third closest match, and so on. However, if the securitizer is delisted 
during any of the three years following the transaction, we terminate the performance 
adjusted computation during that year.  
 
5.3.  Long term market reaction  
 
In order to investigate the long term market impact of securitization, we calculate 
the buy-and-hold return (BHR) for our first-time securitizers and their matched peers as  
( ) %1001)1(1 ×−+∏= = itTti RBHR i , 
where Rit is the ith firm’s return on the tth day, and Ti is the number of trading days in the 
period following securitization. Once the BHR is calculated, we evaluate the difference 
between the two such that 
                                                 
14
 Barber and Lyon (1997) find that substantial size differences between the event firm and its matched peer 
would cause both to differ significantly in their equity performance. Hence we limit our size match to 10% 
or better.  
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Table 3 presents the peer-adjusted BHR 15  results. The full sample’s mean (-
28.52%) and median (-9.42%) two-year DBHR are significantly negative, with 95% 
confidence. The underperformance, which is mainly driven by non-bank securitizers, 
persists to a lesser degree during the third year as well.  
 
5.4.  Long term operating performance 
 
Next, we compare securitizers with non-securitizers in terms of ROA, equity to 
total assets (EQ/TA), equity to managed assets 16  (EQ/MA), ROE, and MBE. We 
construct the ratio of equity to managed assets (Equity/MA) and follow it for three years 
(-1, +1). If the transaction took place before June 30th, we define MA0 as total assets in 
year 0 plus the securitization proceeds. Similarly, we define MA1 as total assets in year 1 
plus proceeds. If on the other hand the transaction took place after June 30th, MA0 equals 
total assets, and MA1 equals total assets plus proceeds. Under both scenarios, MA-1 
equals total asset in that year. The MA calculation is a conservative estimation since any 
issuer is likely to continue securitizing following the first event, and as a result have a 
higher amount of managed assets after year 1.  
Table 4A reports the median peer-adjusted performance measures (securitizer’s 
performance minus peer’s). Overall securitizers perform poorly before and after the 
transaction, mainly due to the underperformance of non-banks. In Table 4B we report an 
                                                 
15
 There are 118 observations in the event study because one of the banks, American Continental Corp, did 
not trade on an exchange at the time it securitized. 
 
16
 Managed assets include both on- and off-balance sheet assets.  
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industry-adjusted operating performance measure.17 We subtract the industry’s median 
from the securitizer’s ratio in order to obtain the industry-adjusted measure. The results 
for the full sample are similar to those presented in table 4B, yet this time the 
underperformance is attributed to banks. Their Equity/TA and Equity/MA are 
significantly lower then the industry’s median before, during, and after the transaction. 
While banks tend to have a superior ROE in the year leading to the event, it deteriorates 
thereafter. Finally, MBE provides some evidence on the level of financial distress that 
banks experience. In the two years leading to the first securitization, banks outperform 
their industry. However, in the two years following the event, signs of distress appear as 
the ratio of MBE deteriorates, before it improves back again in the third year following 
the event.  
 
5.5.  Securitization and risk 
 
Up to this point, we have established that the initiation of securitization is 
associated with a negative market reaction along with poor long-term stock and operating 
performance. This section investigates the impact of securitization on the issuer’s level of 
risk. To this end, we compute three measures of firm risk as suggested by Anderson and 
Fraser (2000), and test whether they are significantly different following the transaction. 
We estimate each measure for a period of one year before and one year after the event, 
without including the 10-days surrounding the event. We define total risk as the standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns. Firm specific risk is measured as the standard 
                                                 
17
 Cornett, Ors, and Teharanian (2002) examine industry-adjusted operating performance of BHC that 
established a Section 20 subsidiary to conduct investment banking activities. We include a similar industry-
adjusted measure for comparison. 
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deviation of the residuals from the market model for each firm. Finally, systematic risk is 
the difference between firm’s total and specific risk. It measures the influence of 
underlying economic and financial conditions that affect all firms. Specifically, our risk 
measures are obtained as follows: 
Total Risk σ=−= ∑ 2)(1 xx
n
i       (1) 
where xi is the securitizer’s daily return and x is the expected market return. Following 
from (1), 
Firm specific risk εεε =−= ∑ 2)(1 i
n
     (2) 
where ε’s are the residuals of the single-index market model, constructed using the CRSP 
equally-weighted returns so that: 
iR imii R εβα ++= )(       
Firm systematic risk = Total risk – Firm specific risk   (3) 
The systematic risk, however, still needs to take account of leverage. While 
securitizing firms’ accounting (on-balance sheet) leverage may not change (or may 
decline), the securitizing firm’s implicit leverage (as measured by total assets under 
management) increased. In order to obtain implicit leverage, we utilize the Hamada 
(1969) equation such that  
    
( )( )T
E
D
DUUL −−+= 1ββββ       (4) 
First we use the standard market model to estimate β  prior to securitization for a 
period of one year, without including the 10-days prior to the event. This is essentially an 
estimation of the levered beta, or priorL,β . Next, we obtain the unlevered beta, or Uβ , from 
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equation (4) by using the estimated priorL,β , the book value of debt-to-equity, and the 
appropriate corporate income tax bracket (T). We assume debt is risk-less. Finally, we 
use the market model to estimate the one-year post-event postL,β . We use equation (4) and 
the information on postL,β , Uβ  and T to calculate the implied D/E ratio after securitization 
and compare it to the accounting D/E ratio. An implied D/E ratio higher than the 
accounting D/E ratio indicates that the increase in systematic risk is due to implicit 
leverage rather than other factors.  
From panel A of Table 5 we observe that for all securitizers there is a significant 
increase in all three risk measures following the first securitization. The mean (median) 
increase in firm’s total risk is roughly 20% (7%), while the increase in systemic risk is 
more pronounced at about 35% (20%). The changes are highly significant in both the 
mean and median levels. The increase in systematic risk is even more profound for our 
banks sample. For the median bank that securitizes for the first time, systematic risk goes 
up by 66%, an increase that is highly significant at the 1% level. As an alternative 
measure of a change in systematic risk, we calculate the pre- and post- transaction beta 
for our securitizers using a standard market model, and test for the significance of the 
difference. The results for banks indicate that there is a significant increase in systematic 
risk, as proxied by the increase in their beta. Finally, non-banks exhibit a significant 
increase in total risk of 17% (6%), driven by an average increase in firm specific risk of 
16%, yet neither their systematic risk nor their beta changes significantly.  
If the documented increase in banks’ systematic risk is due to securitization, then 
a natural prediction would be that systematic risk should remain unchanged for banks that 
do not securitize. To test this prediction, we perform similar analysis on our matched 
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non-securitizers. From panel B of Table 5 we learn that none of those risk measures 
changes during that time period.  
While the first part of Table 5 introduces the differences in performance measures 
within each group, the second part introduces the differences between securitizers and 
non-securitizers before and after the event. Overall, panel C illustrates that pre-event 
securitizers are not riskier than non-securitizers. However, after securitization there are 
big differences between the two. Following the event, we observe in panel D that 
securitizers exhibit a significant increase across all risk measures as compared with non-
securitizers. Specifically, systematic risk is higher for banks that securitize, whereas both 
systematic and firm specific risks are higher for non-banks that securitize, as compared 
with non-banks that do not securitize.  
The conclusion from Table 5 is that first-time securitizers, specifically banks, 
experience a significant increase in systematic risk after securitization. Table 6 relates 
that finding with implicit leverage. By using the Hamada equation, we show that implicit 
leverage is higher than accounting leverage for securitizing firms. Banks have the most 
dramatic difference, with implicit D/E ratios higher than accounting D/E ratios by an 
average of 20%. Hence we can conclude that the increase in systematic risk for banks is 
driven by an increase in implicit leverage. Hence, securitization is more like a financing 
than a sale.  
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6.  Multivariate Analysis 
 
So far results have indicated that securitization has a negative impact on first time 
securitizers. Banks experience negative market reaction, perform poorly relative to their 
industry, and suffer from a significant increase in total and systematic risk. Non-banks 
underperform in terms of long-term BHR and peer-adjusted measures, and experience an 
increase in firm specific risk. One question that comes into mind is whether any firm or 
deal characteristics can explain the above results. To that end, we use a multivariate 
setting to investigate any residual relationships. 
 
6.1.  Sample selection bias 
 
A firm’s decision on whether to securitize may not be random. Sample selectivity 
bias can cause the error terms in a given model to be correlated, thus biasing the 
estimated parameters. We implement Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure to 
overcome self-selection bias created by a firm’s choice to securitize, by incorporating the 
securitization decision in to the econometric estimation. In the first stage the decision to 
securitize is estimated using a probit model. In the second stage we control for self 
selection by including the inverse Mill’s ratio, obtained from the probit model. The 
potential securitization determinants that we control for are firm type (dummy=1 if bank), 
the ratio of equity/assets, an interaction term bank*(equity/assets), the three year pre-
transaction (t-3 to t-1) average growth rate in assets, an interaction term bank*(Growth 
rate), and year dummies.   
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Banks are more likely to securitize because it allows them to meet regulatory 
requirements (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988), reduce interest rate risk, and focus on 
activities in which they have a comparative advantage. Firm size is expected to be 
positively correlated with securitization as well. Given the large fixed costs associated 
with each transaction, larger firms are more likely to afford them. The growth rate in 
assets is also expected to be positively correlated with securitization. Banks are required 
to maintain an adequate capital ratio. Since capital is expensive, banks that experience 
growth in assets are more likely to move them off-balance-sheet through securitization 
(Calomiris and Mason, 2004). The positive relation is also expected to hold for non-
banks. The reason is that through securitization, non banks can diversify their asset 
funding sources, and obtain funds cheaper than through straight debt or stock issuance.  
The equity/assets ratio is expected to be inversely related with the decision to 
securitize. Poorly capitalized banks are likely to securitize so that they can meet 
regulatory capital requirements. The negative relation should hold for non-banks as well, 
as equity/assets can proxy for excessive risk taking. According to Hill (1996), 
securitization should be more valuable for riskier companies, for which other sources of 
funds are more expansive.  
We combine each first-time securitizer with all public firms in its respective 
industry (2-digit SIC code) in year t-1, and report the first-stage probit estimations on the 
decision to securitize in Table 7 for the full and sub-samples (banks and non-banks). Size 
is the most prominent variable affecting the first-time decision to securitize. Furthermore, 
the growth rate in assets is a significant determinant for banks. The bank dummy variable 
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is negative but insignificant, while the capital ratio has the expected negative signs, but it 
is not a significant determinant of securitization initiation 
 
6.2.  OLS estimation 
 
In the second stage we use OLS estimation to investigate the relation between the 
documented poor performance and any firm or deal characteristics. At the same time, we 
control for selection bias by including the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained in the first-stage 
probit model. The firm characteristics that we control for are firm type (bank or non-
bank), the ratio of equity to total assets, the three-year average growth rate in assets, and 
firm size. We include the interaction term bank*(equity/assets) to control for the 
possibility that well capitalized banks perform better than others.  
The deal characteristics that we control for are deal size, underwriter’s rank, 
deal’s rating, and the type of underlying asset. We use the natural log of the deal’s 
proceeds to control for deal size. Other measures such as proceeds scaled by assets or 
proceeds scaled by market value of equity yield similar results. We employ a dummy 
variable, prestigious underwriter, which controls for underwriter reputation. It takes the 
value of 1 if the underwriter’s rank is equal to or greater than the sample’s median.18 We 
use a dummy variable to control for the securitization’s highest rated bond by either S&P 
or Moody’s, which equals 1 for a triple-A rated senior tranche.19 Finally, the mortgage-
                                                 
18
 We use Jay Ritter’s updated IPO underwriter reputation available on his website at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter . 
19Converting credit rating by S&P (Moody’s) into a numerical number such that AAA (Aaa) corresponds to 
a value of 23, AA+ (Aa1) is equal to 22, etc. and an unrated deal (NR) has a value of 1 does not change the 
results. We prefer the dummy indicator over the numerical specification because there is little rating 
variation. Almost 85% of our sample senior tranches are AAA rated.  
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related dummy controls for the type of transaction, specifically, if it relates to CMO, 
mortgage backed bond, or mortgage backed note.  
The first set of regressions presented in table 8 relates stock performance with the 
various firm and deal characteristics. Similarly to the univariate analysis, banks 
experience a negative three-day CAR to their first securitization announcement. The bank 
coefficient of -0.064 is significant at the 1% level. However, the positive coefficient on 
the interaction term bank*(equity/assets) of 0.518 (t = 2.22), suggests that investors are 
aware of a bank’s ability to engage in excessive risk taking, as the market reaction to the 
announcement by a well capitalized banks is more favorable. Furthermore, favorable 
market reactions are also associated with banks that exhibit higher growth rates (t=2.80), 
indicating the importance of capital relief for those banks.  
There is also evidence that capital plays a significant role in the long-term stock 
performance of first-time securitizers, as observed in the 3 year peer-adjusted BHR 
results. Specifically, the coefficient on the bank*(equity/assets) term of 13.34 is 
significant at the 5% level (t=2.36). The coefficient’s economic significance indicates 
that a one standard deviation increase in the capital ratio of first-time securitizing banks is 
associated with a 28% improvement in their long-term stock performance, relative to 
similar banks that do not securitize20. It is interesting to note that the initial decision to 
securitize is negatively related to the 3-year peer adjusted BHR and the self-selection 
indicator, lambda, is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level. Finally, the 3-
year average post transaction industry adjusted market-to-book value of equity (MBE) is 
significantly lower for banks, but higher for well-capitalized banks.  
                                                 
20
 The standard deviation for our bank sample equity/assets is 0.021. Thus, the effect of a one standard 
deviation change in equity/assets ratio on the peer-adjusted BHR is 13.34*0.021=0.2803. 
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From the full sample regressions, it is obvious that the stock performance of 
banks differs significantly from that of non-banks. To better understand those differences, 
we run the same regressions on these sub-samples and report the results in panel B of 
table 8 21 . Under this setup, the capital ratio for banks is directly related to stock 
performance. A one standard deviation increase in that ratio is associated with a 1.20% 
increase in the three-day CAR. Given that the average market capitalization of our bank 
sample is $1.55 billion, this translates into an $18.6 million three-day announcement 
gain. The 3-year peer-adjusted BHR is significantly stronger for well capitalized banks, 
but higher-rated securitizations hurt long-term performance. The coefficients on both the 
Aaa deal rating and prestigious underwriter dummies are significantly negative at the 5% 
level. The rating dummy suggests that sponsor performance deteriorates with greater 
credit enhancement. The significance on the prestigious underwriter dummy can be 
explained similarly, as prestigious underwriters are likely to be involved with transactions 
with greater credit enhancements. Finally, the long-term industry adjusted MBE is 
significantly higher for well capitalized banks.22 
In Table 9 we investigate the implication of securitization on risk. Post event beta 
is higher for banks, overall, but lower for well capitalized banks yet neither coefficient is 
statistically significant. Surprisingly though, the decision to securitize is associated with a 
lower beta (lambda = -0.531, t=-3.72). The sub-sample settings in panel B reveals that 
beta is marginally lower for well capitalized banks (t=-1.95). For non-banks, the growth 
rate is positively correlated with beta. For either sub-sample, lambda has no effect on 
                                                 
21
 For panel B in both tables 8 and 9 we use the self-selection indicator (lambda) that was estimated using 
the sub-samples in table 7.  
22
 Using the peer-adjusted MBE instead of the industry adjusted ratio provides similar results regarding the 
importance of the capital ratio.  
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beta. Total risk, as measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns for a period 
of one year following the event, is lower for well capitalized banks, with a highly 
significant coefficient of -0.244. Similarly, the systematic risk measure of implied D/E 
ratio (obtained from the Hamada equation) is inversely related to the equity/assets ratio. 
Finally, securitization significantly increases a bank’s total risk and implied D/E ratio, as 
lambda is positive and significant at the 5% level.  
 
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The empirical work above analyzes investor reactions to firms’ first securitization 
announcements, postulating that those first announcements are accompanied by investor 
reactions and changes to firm operating results that are not present in follow-on 
securitizations. The negative short-term equity returns and negative long-term operating 
performance following the beginning of securitization constitute classic evidence 
suggesting that securitizations are more similar to financings than asset sales.  
Additional analysis shows that securitization is also associated with increased 
systematic risk, suggesting that the rapid growth fueled by securitization is similar to 
taking on substantial additional leverage. The results are strongest for banks, suggesting 
that regulatory capital arbitrage may create the incentive for greater leverage, and 
therefore greater increases in risk. Again, such results suggest for banks and non-banks 
alike, securitization is more akin to a financing than a sale. 
The findings have implications for accounting and regulatory recognition of 
securitizations. While it is easy to argue that securitizations are not true asset sales, it is 
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more difficult to argue how they should be correctly accounted for on firm balance 
sheets. If expected loss remains on balance sheet through residual interests, firm capital 
should not be reduced significantly compared to on-balance sheet treatment.  
On the other hand, if firms can justify some risk transfer, i.e., of unexpected loss, 
they should be awarded capital relief by investors and regulators alike. In that respect, 
proposed FASB policy of full on-balance sheet treatment goes too far. Nonetheless, the 
ability to analyze the subject further – for both investors and academics – is hampered by 
the dogmatic philosophy of dichotomously characterizing securitizations as either a true 
sale or a financing, where the “true sale” characterization relieves the issuing firm of any 
responsibility for reporting managed (securitized) assets. Simple reporting requirements, 
therefore, would go a long way toward furthering our understanding of the importance of 
securitization. Hence, there remains much work to be done to understand better the 
meaning of securitization in today’s marketplace and the proper role for reporting and 
regulatory action in the future.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Deal Distribution by Industry   
Sample includes 119 first securitization events, as identified by SDC, between 1977 and 
2002. Banks are firms with an SIC code that starts with 60. Non-banks are all the others. 
All variables are from the fiscal year prior to the transaction (i.e. year -1). Firm size (in 
total assets), market cap (market value of equity), and SEC size (transaction’s principal) 
are CPI adjusted with 1998 as the base year. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
Panel B: Banks 
 
 
Panel C: Non-banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Median Min MAX STD N 
Assets ($ millions) 13,679 5,708 20.76 103,786 17,917 119 
Market cap ($ million) 3,330 979 5.39 92,399 9,744 119 
SEC size ($ millions) 262 135 1.43 2,357 359 119 
SEC/assets 12.94% 2.75% 0.03% 230% 30.12% 119 
SEC/Market cap 71.04% 24.00% 0.29% 1,523% 194% 119 
B/M equity 0.85 0.72 0.19 4.33 0.54 119 
Assets ($ millions) 16,016 12,470 106 54843 15.631 55 
Market cap ($ million) 1,553  906 5.39 7,692 1,910 55 
SEC size ($ millions) 214 157 1.43 948 206 55 
SEC/assets 7.15% 1.81% 0.03% 230% 31.13% 55 
SEC/Market cap 93.45% 28.00% 0.29% 1,523% 268% 55 
B/M equity 1.00 0.80 0.19 4.33 0.67 55 
Assets ($ millions) 11,670 2,622 20.76 103,786 19,570 64 
Market cap ($ million) 4,857 1,113 10.50 92,399 13,022 64 
SEC size ($ millions) 303 124 1.82 2,357 450 64 
SEC/assets 17.91% 7.34% 0.06% 163% 28.54% 64 
SEC/Market cap 51.01% 22.00% 0.36% 529% 89.81% 64 
B/M equity 0.72 0.64 0.19 2.08 0.38 64 
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Table 1 continued  
 
Panel D: Deal distribution by industry 
 
 SIC code Frequency % 
Depository institutions 60 55 46.22 
Non depository credit institutions 61 12 10.08 
Electric and gas 49 9 7.56 
Insurance carriers 63 6 5.04 
Building construction 15 5 4.20 
Transportation equipment 37 5 4.20 
Security and commodity brokers 62 5 4.20 
Business services 73 4 3.36 
General merchandise stores 53 3 2.52 
Other - 15 12.60 
Total  119 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Short Run Market Reaction to the First Act of Securitization 
The market model is used to estimate market model parameters using daily stock returns 
with a 200-day estimation period ending 11 days before the announcement date. Market 
returns are proxied by the CRSP value-weighted returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
are estimated over a 3 day period (-1, +1). Sub-samples are based on 2 digit SIC codes 
(60 for banks). T-statistics based on the standardized cross-sectional test statistics. 
Percent negative significance based on sign-statistics.*, **, *** indicates significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Sample Size  Mean  
CAR (-1, +1) 
T-test Percent 
Negative 
Panel A: securitizers with CRSP data 
Full Sample 145  -0.55% -1.25 58* 
      
Banks 65  -0.75% -1.70 65** 
      
Non Banks 80  -0.40% -0.39 52 
 
Panel B: securitizers with CRSP and Compustat data 
Full Sample 118  -0.48% -1.09 59* 
      
Banks 54  -0.88% -2.07** 65** 
      
Non Banks 64  -0.16% 0.09 54 
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TABLE 3 
Peer-Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return Following the First Securitization   
This table reports the buy-and-hold return (BHR) difference between securitizers and their 
matched non-securitizers (peers). Banks are firms with an SIC code that starts with 60. Non-
banks are all the others. Bank peers are chosen based on industry, size, and ROE. Non-bank 
peers are chosen on the basis of exchange, size, and B/M equity. Sample size reported in 
parentheses. Indications of significance of medians are based on Wilcoxon singed-rank tests. 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
    1 Year Peer 
Adjusted 
BHR 
 2 Year Peer 
Adjusted BHR 
 3 Year Peer 
Adjusted BHR 
         
         
Full Sample (118) Mean -9.66%*  -28.62%***  -26.35%* 
  -7.88%**  -9.42%**  -6.33%* 
  
Median 
     
Banks (54)  Mean -6.98%  -18.71%*  -23.28%* 
  Median -4.48%  -3.17%  -18.76% 
         
Non Banks (64) Mean -11.78%  -37.00%**  -37.28% 
  Median -12.96%  -18.65%*  -10.73%** 
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TABLE 4A 
Median Peer-Adjusted Measures 
The table reports the median of peer-adjusted variables (sample firm minus peer firm values). Bank peers are chosen based on 
industry, asset size, and ROE. Non bank peers are chosen on the basis of exchange, size and B/M equity. The Compustat data 
items for the variables are: ROA is net income/assets (item172 / item6), Equity/TA is book value of equity to assets (item60 / 
item6), ROE is net income/equity (item172 / item60), MBE is market-to-book value of equity. Managed assets (MA) in year -
1 equal TA
-1 (i.e. TA in year -1). If the event is before 6/30, then MA0 = (TA0 + proceeds), and MA1 = (TA1+proceeds). If the 
event is after 6/30, MA0= TA0, and MA1= (TA1+proceeds). Year -1 values are from the fiscal year-end prior to the transaction, 
while year 0 represents year-end values of the transaction year. Indications of significance of medians are based on Wilcoxon 
singed-rank tests. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Year  N  ROA  Equity/TA  Equity/MA  ROE  MBE 
 
Panel A: Full sample securitizers 
-1  118  -0.0002  -0.0070***  -0.0070***  0.0053  -0.0011 
0  118  -0.0015*  -0.0177***  -0.0229***  0.0022  -0.0741 
+1  108  -0.0020**  -0.0179***  -0.0235***  -0.0066  0.0019 
+2  106  -0.0034***  -0.0191***  N/A  -0.0048  -0.1381 
+3  102  -0.0032**  -0.0162***  N/A  0.0032  -0.0551 
 
Panel B: Banks that securitize 
-1  54  0.0004  -0.0014  -0.0014  0.0061***  0.0533 
0  54  0.0000  -0.0018  -0.0018  0.0046  -0.0023 
+1  50  0.0004  0.0001  -0.0015  -0.0009  0.0976 
+2  48  0.0008  -0.0019  N/A  0.0033  -0.0935 
+3  48  -0.0008  -0.0010  N/A  0.0016  -0.0577 
 
Panel C: Non banks that securitize  
-1  64  -0.0146*  -0.0889***  -0.0889***  0.0023  -0.0069 
0  64  -0.0160**  -0.1242***  -0.1426***  -0.0107  -0.1408** 
+1  58  -0.0204**  -0.1535***  -0.1660***  -0.0313*  -0.3188** 
+2  58  -0.0343***  -0.1532***  N/A  -0.0090  -0.1715 
+3  54  0.0134*  -0.1465***  N/A  0.0043  -0.0551 
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TABLE 4B 
Median Industry-Adjusted Measures 
The table reports the median of industry-adjusted variables (sample firm minus industry median). Industries are defined 
according to 2-digit SIC code. Banks are firms whose SIC code starts with 60. Securitizers are excluded from the industry 
starting one year before the transaction. The Compustat data items for the variables are: ROA is net income/assets (item172 / 
item6), Equity/TA is book value of equity to assets (item60 / item6), ROE is net income/equity (item172 / item60), MBE is 
market-to-book value of equity. Managed assets (MA) in year -1 equal TA
-1 (i.e. TA in year -1). If the event is before 6/30, 
then MA0 = (TA0 + proceeds), and MA1 = (TA1+proceeds). If the event is after 6/30, MA0= TA0, and MA1= (TA1+proceeds). 
Year -1 values are from the fiscal year-end prior to the transaction, while year 0 represents year-end values of the transaction 
year. Indications of significance of medians are based on Wilcoxon singed-rank tests. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Year  N  ROA  Equity/TA  Equity/MA  ROE  MBE 
 
Panel A: Full sample securitizers 
-1  118  0.0003  -0.0096**  -0.0096**  0.0127***  0.1131*** 
0  118  -0.0000  -0.0056***  -0.0057***  0.0256  0.0370* 
+1  108  -0.0000  -0.0100***  -0.0118***  0.0084  0.0222 
+2  106  -0.0011**  -0.0178***  N/A  0.0094  -0.0049 
+3  102  -0.0007  -0.0163***  N/A  0.0060  0.0386 
 
Panel B: Banks that securitize 
-1  54  0.0006  -0.0065***  -0.0065***  0.0170***  0.1225** 
0  54  0.0000  -0.0060***  -0.0060***  0.0281  0.0717** 
+1  50  0.0000  -0.0103***  -0.0119***  0.0121  0.0414* 
+2  48  0.0002  -0.0121***  N/A  0.0127  0.0973* 
+3  48  -0.0004  -0.0117***  N/A  0.0272  0.1962** 
Panel C: Non banks that securitize  
-1  64  -0.0010  -0.0134  -0.0134  0.0006  0.0747* 
0  64  -0.0019  -0.0173  -0.0411**  0.0007  0.0185 
+1  58  -0.0045  -0.0644**  -0.0734***  -0.0055  -0.1038 
+2  58  -0.0049*  -0.0520**  N/A  -0.0040  -0.1415 
+3  54  -0.0030  -0.0573*  N/A  -0.0046  -0.1109 
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TABLE 5  
The Impact of Securitization on Firm Risk 
The table reports the mean [median] of various risk measures and their associated change within a year before and 
after the first act of securitization, not including the 10 days surrounding the event. Non securitizers are from the 
matched sample, in which banks are matched on industry, asset size, and ROE, whereas non banks are matched on 
exchange, size and BM equity. Banks are firms with a two digit SIC code of 60. Non banks are all the others. Total 
risk is the standard deviation of daily returns expressed as percent for each firm taken from CRSP. Systematic risk is 
the difference between total risk and firm specific risk. Firm specific risk is the standard deviation of the residual from 
the market model regression for each firm. Banks are firms whose SIC code starts with 60. Tests statistics for the 
differences are based on t-statistics for means and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Full Sample (118)  Banks (54)  Non Banks (64)  
Pre Post ∆  Pre Post ∆  Pre Post ∆ 
Panel A: Risk measures for securitizers 
 
Total risk 2.19 2.61 0.41***  1.94 2.36 0.41**  2.40 2.82 0.41** 
 [2.10] [2.19] 0.15***  [1.72] [2.06] 0.17**  [2.35] [2.41] 0.15* 
 
Systematic  0.14 0.20 0.05**  0.13 0.19 0.05*  0.14 0.20 0.06* 
 [0.10] [0.12] 0.02**  [0.09] [0.14] 0.06***  [0.12] [0.12] 0.00 
 
   Beta 1.20 1.32 0.12**  1.16 1.29 0.12**  1.24 1.36 0.12 
 [1.21] [1.32] 0.15**  [1.05] [1.29] 0.12**  [1.27] [1.35] 0.15 
 
Firm specific  2.05 2.41 0.35***  1.80 2.17 0.36*  2.26 2.61 0.35** 
 [1.91] [2.02] 0.11**  [1.60] [1.88] 0.10*  [2.14] [2.21] 0.13* 
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Table 5 – continued 
 
Full Sample (118)  Banks (54)  Non Banks (64)  
Pre Post ∆  Pre Post ∆  Pre Post ∆ 
 
Panel B: Risk measures for non securitizers 
Total risk  2.16 2.19 0.03  1.89 1.94 0.05  2.37 2.39 0.02 
 [1.91] [1.97] [0.04]  [1.62] [1.77] 0.15  [2.19] [2.06] -0.01 
 
Systematic  0.13 0.14 0.01  0.13 0.15 0.02  0.14 0.14 0.00 
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.02]  [0.09] [0.10] 0.03*   [0.09] [0.07] -0.00 
 
   Beta 1.04 0.99 -0.05  1.00 0.97 -0.03  1.06 1.00 -0.06 
 1.05 0.97 [0.00]  [1.00] [0.88] -0.13  [1.07] [1.01] 0.04 
 
Firm specific  2.02 2.04 0.02  1.76 1.79 0.03  2.23 2.24 0.01 
 [1.81] [1.78] [0.02]  [1.53] [1.67] 0.09  [2.03] [1.95] -0.01 
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Table 5 – continued 
 
Full Sample (118)  Banks (54)  Non Banks (64)  
Panel C: Differences in pre transaction risk measures (Securitizer-Nonsecuritizer)  
  
Total risk   0.04  0.06  0.03 
  [0.12]  [0.12]  [0.11] 
       
Systematic   0.01  0.01  0.00 
  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.02] 
       
   Beta  0.17**  0.16*  0.17 
  [0.13]**  [0.03]  [0.25] 
       
Firm specific   0.03  0.04  0.04 
  [0.09]  [0.13]  [0.04] 
 
Panel D: Differences in post transaction risk measures (Securitizer-Nonsecuritizer)  
  
Total risk   0.39***  0.38*  0.43** 
  [0.26]***  [0.31]**  [0.23]*** 
       
Systematic   0.06***  0.04***  0.04* 
  [0.04]***  [0.04]***  [0.04]*** 
       
   Beta  0.32***  0.30***  0.35*** 
  [0.26]***  [0.20]***  [0.34]*** 
       
Firm specific   0.33***  0.35*  0.38** 
  [0.23]***  [0.26]*  [0.18]*** 
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TABLE 6  
Comparison of Post Transaction Implied and Actual Debt-to-Equity Ratios 
The table reports the mean [median] of the difference between the post transaction 
implied D/E ratio and the actual D/E ratio. The implied D/E is obtained from the Hamada 
equation. The Actual D/E ratio is from the year end of the securitization year. N reported 
in parentheses. Banks are firms with a two digit SIC code of 60. Non banks are all the 
others. Tests statistics for differences are based on t-statistics for means and the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for medians. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively 
 
Implied Debt/Equity Actual Debt/Equity Difference 
 
Full Sample (118) 
 
  
20.62 13.10 7.51** 
[12.74] [10.04] 1.14*** 
 
Banks (54) 
 
  
24.75 19.67 5.08** 
[17.24] [15.08] 2.50*** 
 
Non Banks (64) 
 
  
17.13 7.56 9.57 
[3.41] [3.16] 0.50* 
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TABLE 7 
Probit Estimation of a Firm’s Decision to Securitize  
The table reports coefficients from a probit model of the decision to securitize (dummy = 
1), using a sample period of 1977-2002, which includes a total of 118 securitizers. Non-
securitizers are all public firms within the same industry (2-digit SIC). Banks are firms 
with a two digit SIC code of 60. Growth in assets is the 3 year pre-securitization average 
(t-3 to t-1). Equity-to-assets is defined as book value of equity to total assets (item60 / 
item6). All variables are from the year end prior to the event (i.e. year t-1). Z-statistics 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.  
 
 Expected 
sign 
 Full 
sample 
 Banks  Non-
banks 
Ln(assets) +  0.260*** (9.61)  
0.3000*** 
(5.44)  
0.249*** 
(7.73) 
        
Growth in assets +  0.020 (1.03)  
1.022** 
(2.13)  
0.019 
(1.01) 
        
Equity / assets -  -0.043 (-0.16)  
-0.018 
(-0.01)  
-0.079 
(-0.58) 
        
Bank  +  -0.128 (-0.44)     
        
Bank*(equity/assets) +/-  -2.853 (-0.81)     
        
Bank*(Growth in assets) +  0.904** (2.15)     
        
Intercept   -2.290*** (-4.56)  
-4.232*** 
(-5.13)  
-2.263*** 
(-2.86) 
        
Year Dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
LR Chi squared   219.48***  128.47***  112.39*** 
Pseudo R2   0.2043  0.2919  0.1890 
N   4,174  1,690  2,484 
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TABLE 8 
Regressions of Stock Performance on Firm and Deal Characteristics  
The market model is used to estimate market model parameters using daily stock returns with a 
200-day estimation period ending 11 days before the announcement date. Market returns are 
proxied by the CRSP value-weighted returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated over a 3 
day period. Peer-adjusted variables represent the difference between issuer and its matched non-
issuer’s. Bank peers are chosen based on industry, asset size, and ROE. Non-bank peers are 
chosen based exchange (NYSE/AMEX vs. NASDAQ), size (MVE) and B/M equity. Banks are 
firms with SIC code 60. Non-banks are all the others. MBEPOST is the 3 year post event average 
(t+1 to t+3) market-to-book value of equity. Equity/TA and assets are from year-end prior to the 
event. Asset growth rate is the pre-event 3 year average. Prestigious underwriter = 1 if the 
underwriter’s rank is 9 or higher (the sample’s median). Deal rating dummy =1 if the senior 
tranche is Aaa rated by either Moody’s or S&P. Mortgage Related = 1 if the transaction is either 
CMO, mortgage backed note, or mortgage backed bond. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio, 
obtained from a first-stage probit estimation in which the selection variable is 1 if a firm chooses 
to securitize. The probit’s independent variables are from table 7. T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 CAR (-1, +1)  3 Year Peer Adj. 
BHR 
 Industry Adj. 
MBEPOST 
Bank -0.064*** 
(-3.03) 
 -0.306 
(-0.49) 
 -1.238*** 
(-2.65) 
Equity/TA -0.058 
(-1.13) 
 0.815 
(0.63) 
 0.348 
(0.39) 
Bank*(equity/assets) 0.518** 
(2.22) 
 13.348** 
(2.36) 
 23.68*** 
(3.51) 
Growth in Assets 
 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
 1.181 
(1.41) 
 -0.054 
(-0.27) 
Bank*(Growth in Assets) 
 
0.084*** 
(2.80) 
 -1.953 
(-1.56) 
 -0.603 
(-0.99) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.68) 
 0.069 
(0.59) 
 -0.058 
(-0.78) 
Ln(Proceeds) 0.007 
(1.64) 
 0.081 
(0.40) 
 0.035 
(0.41) 
Prestigious Underwriter -0.004 
(-0.46) 
 -0.054 
(-0.20) 
 0.011 
(0.05) 
Deal rating Aaa 0.022* 
(1.79) 
 -0.193 
(-0.98) 
 -0.439 
(-1.51) 
Mortgage Related  0.003 
(0.23) 
 -0.453 
(-1.36) 
 -0.108 
(-0.41) 
Lambda  0.001 
(0.08) 
 -0.675* 
(-1.82) 
 -0.317* 
(-1.75) 
Intercept -0.014 
(-0.19) 
 -0.302 
(-0.19) 
 1.434 
(1.54) 
 
     
R2 0.1391  0.1896  0.1687 
F-statistics 2.57***  1.17  1.82* 
N 118  118  108 
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Table 8 Panel B: Sub samples 
 
 CAR (-1, +1)  3 Year Peer Adj. 
BHR 
 Industry Adj. MBE-
POST 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
Equity/TA 0.575** 
(2.49) 
-0.060 
(-1.12) 
 17.15*** 
(2.79) 
0.419 
(0.31) 
 24.285*** 
(3.68) 
0.015 
(0.02) 
Growth in Assets 
 
0.090*** 
(3.13) 
-0.005 
(-0.56) 
 -0.141 
(-0.21) 
1.245 
(1.46) 
 -0.692 
(-1.23) 
-0.082 
(-0.38) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
 0.221* 
(1.71) 
0.017 
(0.11) 
 0.168* 
(1.80) 
-0.071 
(-0.85) 
Ln(Proceeds) 0.013*** 
(2.68) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
 0.133 
(1.02) 
0.062 
(0.20) 
 0.220** 
(2.13) 
-0.047 
(-0.39) 
Prestigious 
underwriter 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
 -0.633** 
(-2.37) 
0.313 
(0.71) 
 -0.220 
(-1.05) 
0.262 
(0.64) 
Deal rating Aaa 0.000 
(0.06) 
0.039* 
(1.85) 
 -0.547** 
(-2.36) 
0.032 
(0.10) 
 -0.861** 
(-2.19) 
-0.057 
(-0.15) 
Mortgage Related  0.016 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
 0.300 
(0.86) 
-0.838 
(-1.33) 
 0.231 
(0.69) 
-0.077 
(-0.20) 
Lambda  -0.011 
(-1.55) 
0.016 
(1.16) 
 -0.182 
(-0.81) 
-1.081 
(-1.45) 
 0.010 
(0.07) 
-0.108 
(-0.42) 
Intercept -0.073 
(-1.13) 
-0.062 
(-0.77) 
 -2.939* 
(-1.98) 
0.680 
(0.41) 
 -3.007*** 
(-2.96) 
1.150 
(1.25) 
 
        
R2 0.2787 0.1260  0.3277 0.2285  0.5659 0.0274 
F-statistics 3.62*** 1.33  3.40*** 0.71  4.06*** 0.39 
N 54 64  54 64  50 58 
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TABLE 9 
Regressions of Risk Measures on Firm and Deal Characteristics  
The post transaction β is obtained from the one year market model, excluding the 10 days 
following the event. Post event total risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns for one 
year, excluding the 10 days following the event. Implied D/E ratio is obtained from the Hamada 
equation (see table 6). Banks are firms with a two digit SIC code 60. Non-banks are all the others. 
Equity/TA and assets are from year-end prior to the event. Asset growth rate is the pre-event 3 
year average. Prestigious underwriter = 1 if the underwriter’s rank is 9 or higher (the sample’s 
median). ). Deal rating dummy =1 if the senior tranche is Aaa rated by either Moody’s or S&P. 
Mortgage Related = 1 if the transaction is either CMO, mortgage backed note, or mortgage 
backed bond. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from a first-stage probit estimation in 
which the selection variable is 1 if a firm chooses to securitize. The probit’s independent 
variables are from table 7. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, 
* indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Post Event β  Post Event total 
risk 
 Ln(Implied D/E) 
Bank 0.460 
(1.29) 
 0.008 
(0.99) 
 0.758* 
(1.73) 
Equity/TA 0.139 
(0.26) 
 -0.024** 
(-2.09) 
 -5.483*** 
(-5.88) 
Bank*(equity/assets) -5.817 
(-1.34) 
 -0.244*** 
(-2.68) 
 -7.346 
(-1.44) 
Growth in Assets 
 
0.332*** 
(3.65) 
 0.000 
(0.34) 
 0.429 
(1.08) 
Bank*(Growth in Assets) 
 
-0.599 
(-1.31) 
 0.005 
(0.63) 
 -0.300 
(-0.54) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
-0.075 
(-1.41) 
 -0.001 
(-0.85) 
 0.119 
(1.11) 
Ln(Proceeds) -0.027 
(-0.42) 
 0.000 
(0.83) 
 0.040 
(0.30) 
Prestigious Underwriter 0.000 
(0.00) 
 -0.001 
(-0.27) 
 -0.131 
(-0.63) 
Deal rating Aaa 0.039 
(0.28) 
 0.000 
(0.14) 
 -0.115 
(-0.53) 
Mortgage Related  0.256 
(1.64) 
 0.000 
(0.13) 
 0.506** 
(2.20) 
Lambda  -0.531*** 
(-3.72) 
 0.008** 
(2.22) 
 0.421 
(1.40) 
Intercept 2.923*** 
(3.72) 
 0.022 
(1.13) 
 1.029 
(0.72) 
 
     
R2 0.2325  0.1870  0.6031 
F-statistics 4.63***  3.67***  12.74*** 
N 118  118  110 
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Table 9 Panel B: Sub samples 
 
 Post Event β  Post Event total risk  Ln(Implied D/E) 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
 Banks Non 
Banks 
Equity/TA -9.51* 
(-1.95) 
-0.019 
(-0.03) 
 -0.277** 
(2.54) 
-0.024* 
(-1.95) 
 -
18.402*** 
(-4.32) 
-
5.213*** 
(-5.30) 
Growth in Assets 
 
-0.387 
(-1.04) 
0.311*** 
(3.08) 
 -0.002 
(-0.38) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
 -0.007 
(-0.02) 
0.409 
(0.97) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
0.060 
(0.80) 
-0.012 
(-0.18) 
 0.000 
(0.41) 
-0.002 
(-1.56) 
 -0.046* 
(-0.59) 
0.184 
(1.19) 
Ln(Proceeds) -0.058 
(-1.06) 
-0.050 
(-0.43) 
 0.000 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.87) 
 0.050 
(0.79) 
-0.045 
(-0.15) 
Prestigious 
underwriter 
0.046 
(0.25) 
0.021 
(0.10) 
 -0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
 -0.042 
(-0.27) 
-0.232 
(-0.67) 
Deal rating Aaa 0.110 
(0.74) 
0.087 
(0.29) 
 0.008** 
(2.01) 
-0.004 
(-0.60) 
 -0.043 
(-0.33) 
-0.168 
(-0.40) 
Mortgage Related  0.147 
(0.49) 
0.418** 
(2.08) 
 -0.004 
(-0.94) 
0.003 
(0.73) 
 -0.025 
(-0.10) 
0.652* 
(1.91) 
Lambda  0.063 
(0.62) 
-0.193 
(-0.78) 
 0.007** 
(2.15) 
0.006 
(1.50) 
 0.274** 
(2.33) 
0.549 
(1.23) 
Intercept 1.456 
(1.56) 
1.799 
(1.62) 
 0.017 
(0.85) 
0.038** 
(2.44) 
 3.962*** 
(4.74) 
0.746 
(0.43) 
 
        
R2 0.2274 0.1567  0.1956 0.2300  0.3696 0.5337 
F-statistics 1.48 2.75**  1.86* 2.31**  4.19*** 9.89*** 
N 54 64  54 64  54 56 
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The Information Content of Asset-Backed Securities Downgrades, and the 
Motivation behind Them 
Eric J. Higgins, Ph.D. 
Joseph R. Mason, Ph.D. 
Adi Mordel 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, the asset-backed securitization (ABS) market grew by an 
astonishing 500%, from $456 billion to $2.8 trillion in outstanding securities (including 
non-agency mortgage backed securities, MBS). From 2004 to 2006 alone, special 
purpose vehicles known as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which issue liabilities 
in the form of rated tranches backed by various ABS, grew by 250%, totaling more than 
$550 billion.  
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have played an important role in the growth of the 
securitization market.23 Their intimate involvement in the financial engineering of ABS 
deals, coupled with investors’ requirement of a rating agency “approval”, affected the 
marketability of the issued securities. In that process, CRAs moved away from their 
traditional role of passive credit-quality opinion providers, into the more active role of 
underwriters (Mason and Rosner, 2007b). As underwriters, CRAs gained superior 
knowledge about the opacity and complexity of the various ABS instruments, a 
knowledge that contributed to their status as the de facto regulators of the ABS market. 
Furthermore, regulators’ reliance on credit ratings as risk measures limited the types of 
portfolios that financial institutions were allowed to hold. Since these regulated 
                                                 
23
 See Committee of Global Financial System (2005) and Lucchetti and Ng (2007) for an additional 
discussion on the role of credit rating agencies in the ABS market. 
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institutions desired investing in high-yielding ABS deals, CRAs faced an increased 
demand for grade inflation, and once risk was underestimated, CRAs could earn record 
profits by rating ABS deals (Cantor and Packer, 1994; Calomiris 2008).  
 Underestimation of risk contributed to the tremendous growth of the ABS market, 
which experienced its first major setback in November 2006. Amidst massive 
performance deteriorations of subprime mortgages (the underlying collateral for many of 
the securitization deals), Moody’s acknowledged the associated risks and issued “early 
warnings” for potential future downgrades, and on July 10th 2007, Moody’s downgraded 
more than 400 deals worth a total of $5 billion. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) followed, only 
two days later, with 612 downgrades of more than $7.5 billion worth of ABS deals.  As a 
matter of fact, half of all the downgrades that ever took place in the history of the Home 
Equity ABS market occurred in the first seven months of 2007 (Ashcraft and 
Schuermann, 2008). The first signs of the oncoming financial meltdown were evident, 
and by year end, almost every rated class of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
(RMBS) was downgraded.24 
The fact that securitization has transformed financial intermediation is 
unquestionable. Through it, originators can manage interest rate risk, increase liquidity 
sources, focus on activities in which they possess a comparative advantage, and avoid 
burdensome regulation.25 Calomiris and Mason (2004) indicate that as the securitization 
market evolves, it promotes efficient contracting mechanisms that reduce the need for 
equity capital to support the deal, mitigating adverse selection costs.  
                                                 
24
 Herring Richard J. (2008). “The Darker Side of Securitization: How Subprime Lending Led to a 
Systemic Crisis”, Presentation to the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. 
25
 On the mechanisms and benefits of securitization, see Gorton and Souleles (2006), and Greenbaum and 
Thakor (2007).  
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Yet these benefits seem negligible in light of the 2007 panic. Voices criticizing 
securitization point out that it increases systemic risk due to banks’ habit of retaining the 
equity portion of securitized deals, without having the adequate capital levels on-balance 
sheet to support it. Moreover, since under certain conditions banks are required to absorb 
the losses generated by their failed ABS deals, critics question the transactions’ ability to 
truly separate assets from the originator and relocate risk (Stiglitz, 2008; Krugman, 
2008). CRAs have also been criticized, particularly regarding their inability to measure 
risk and appropriately rate the issued securities. 
The negative sentiment on securitization raises some important questions: was the 
market aware of the potential problems before the 2007 turmoil? Were ABS downgrades 
informative? Could the market discipline “bad” securitizers? Could investors distinguish 
between “good” and “bad” securitizers? Was the downgrade decision due to the deal’s 
performance or due to the issuer’s performance?  
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the above issues. To that end, we 
construct a sample of ABS deal downgrades that occurred between 1986 and 2005 by 
either Moody’s or S&P, and study the downgrade impact on the deal’s ultimate parent. 
We specifically end our sample period in 2005 to avoid the recently troubled years. We 
focus on ABS deals for two reasons. First, we can easily identify their ultimate 
parents/sponsors whereas with CDOs, the identity of originators is unknown due to the 
CDOs’ opaqueness and complexity. Second, an ABS deal can only be accomplished if 
the securitized assets are moved off-balance sheet in a “true sale” according to FASB 
140. As such, an ABS downgrade can provide the optimal situation to test whether the 
benefits and risks of owning the assets are truly removed from the originator. 
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To summarize our results, we demonstrate that the market reaction to an ABS 
downgrade is significantly negative, indicating that investors do not treat the deal 
independently from the ultimate parent, and that the securitization’s underlying “true 
sale” assumption is indeed violated. The most negative announcement returns are 
associated with downgraded ABS deals sponsored by troubled financial institutions (FIs), 
suggesting that investors are aware of sponsors’ ability to support poorly performing 
deals. In addition, market discipline is not limited to a destruction of shareholders’ 
wealth. Ultimate parents of downgraded deals experience significant delays in their ABS 
issuance cycles post- downgrade, suggesting that an originator’s ability to securitize 
depends on its credit quality. Such delays are not observed for “good” securitizers, those 
sponsors of ABS deals that do not suffer downgrades.  
In light of the recent market turmoil that was driven by a myriad of complex 
securities (Gorton, 2008) as well as the numerous calls for comprehensive regulatory 
reforms, our results emphasize that markets were functioning even before the first signs 
of the upcoming panic in the summer of 2007. Investors are able to incorporate new 
information promptly into a securitizer’s stock price, and accurately understand changes 
in its condition as the ability to issue ABS deals post-downgrade is sensitive to the 
securitizer’s credit quality. Since ABS downgrades provide valuable information and 
expose securitizers to market discipline, regulatory reforms should consider incorporating 
such downgrades into the supervisory process. The newly generated information can 
reduce uncertainty about the relation between securitizers and their off-balance sheet 
deals, leading to a faster and effective response by supervisors (Flannery, 2001, Caprio, 
Kunt, and Kane, 2008).  
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With regards to CRAs, our results indicate that the consideration behind some of 
the ABS downgrades is not independent of the ultimate parent’s financial performance. 
Downgraded deals sponsored by non-FIs are associated with the sponsors’ poor pre-event 
stock returns, suggesting that CRAs, just like investors, treat parents and their ABS deals 
as an integral part. That is not the case for deals sponsored by FIs. Here, CRAs tend to 
downgrade deals irrespective of sponsors’ pre-event performance, an indication of 
downgrades driven by deal specific conditions, and potentially greater transparency.  
The rest of the paper proceeds by introducing in section II the corporate finance 
literature on debt downgrades, the accounting treatment of securitization, the importance 
of implicit recourse, and the unique role carried out by rating agencies in the 
securitization process.  Section III discusses the sample construction and its 
characteristics. Section IV examines investors’ treatment of ABS deals by focusing on 
announcement returns and post event stock and operating performance. It continues with 
evidence on the market discipline faced by sponsors of downgraded ABS deals, and tries 
to address the question of whether or not investors could distinguish “good” securitizers 
form “bad” ones. Section V examines whether the rating agencies treat ABS 
independently from their ultimate parents by investigating the pre-downgrade long term 
stock performance. Section VI Summarizes and concludes.   
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1.  Corporate debt downgrades and security returns   
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 The earlier corporate finance literature has provided mixed results utilizing bond 
return data to investigate the impact of rating changes. Weinstein (1977), Wakeman 
(1978), and Pinches and Singleton (1978), have found no evidence of bond price reaction 
to rating changes whereas West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), and Ederington et al. 
(1987) have shown that after controlling for firm and issue characteristics, ratings do 
explain the cross-sectional differences in yield spreads.  The strand of literature that study 
the impact of rating changes on stock returns has been more successful at establishing a 
relation between the two. Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986), Galscock et al. (1987), Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989), Hand et al 
(1992), and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) have shown in general that downgrades affect 
stock returns more significantly than upgrades. 
Some researchers argue that the information content of downgrades might be a 
function of firms’ tendency to release favorable information more readily than 
unfavorable one (Ederington and Goh, 1998). Others suggest that the value of rating 
changes is limited in regulated industries, since the monitoring and supervisory activities 
of regulators increase the flow of information to the capital market. However, 
Schweitzer, Szewczyk, and Varma (1992) show that negative abnormal returns are 
associated with unfavorable debt ratings, and that in fact, downgrades of bank holding 
companies are more pronounced than downgrades of unregulated industrial firms.26    
The notion that all downgrades are necessarily negative events is challenged by 
Goh and Ederington (1993). The authors demonstrate empirically that some rating 
                                                 
26
 Schweitzer et al. (1992) note that regulators may withhold adverse information in order to sustain 
depositor confidence in a troubled bank, preserve its ability to raise capital, and conceal bad news out of 
concern for maintaining stability in the banking system as a whole. If regulators do inhibit the flow of 
information then downgrades should be particularly informative. 
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changes are anticipated by market participants, and only downgrades that are associated 
with deteriorating financial prospects convey new negative information. Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) employ a different methodology to address a similar question and find evidence 
consistent with the asset substitution hypothesis. They examine price reactions to rating 
changes that exclusively reflect rating information (i.e. ratings that are not triggered by 
fundamental changes in risk), and show that while bond prices react negatively to 
downgrades, stock prices react positively, leaving overall firm value unchanged. 
 
2.2.  FASB140 – true sale assumption 
 
 When a typical ABS transaction is initiated, the originator/sponsor sells assets to a 
bankruptcy-remote third party entity (special purpose vehicle/entity, SPE). In return, the 
SPE finances the assets by selling different types of securities, representing claims to the 
cash flows generated by those underlying assets. The Financial Accounting Standard 
Board Statement 140 (FASB140) provides the accounting and reporting standards for the 
transfer and servicing of financial assets, and the extinguishment of any related liabilities. 
Moving assets to the SPE (i.e. off-balance sheet) through securitization hinges crucially 
on the “true sale” assumption envisaged under FASB140.  
To constitute a true sale, the asset/collateral must be sold to the SPE, and the 
asset’s originator cannot retain the benefits and risks of owning the asset. More 
specifically, a true sale has no terms whereby the sponsor is responsible for the future 
performance or condition of the collateral. In case a true sale is deemed to have not 
occurred, such as if the originator maintains control over the asset or that the SPE is not 
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bankruptcy remote, FASB 140 stipulates that the collateral must revert to the sponsor’s 
balance sheet. If the sponsor is a regulated financial institution, then it is required to hold 
regulatory capital against the full value of such collateral. Meeting the true sale 
assumption also affects the firm’s financial statements. If the originator does not 
surrender control over the asset, the transaction resembles secured borrowing, under 
which the originator reclassifies the financial asset as pledged and records debt for the 
amount of cash received. If on the other hand control is surrendered, the originator 
derecognizes the financial asset and records cash for the amount received.27  
 In summary, the ABS structure stipulates that the underlying collateral was 
moved off-balance sheet and that it should pose no contingent risk to the ultimate parent. 
An ABS deal downgrade provides a unique setting to investigate whether the market 
truly considers the deal to be separated form its ultimate parent, and if there are any 
associated costs due to the downgrade decision.  
 
2.3. Implicit recourse and securitization 
 
 Recourse in the banking industry was first discussed by Benvenista and Berger 
(1987) within the context of standby letters of credit (SLC), the earliest most widely used 
form of securitization. Securitized SLC offer its purchaser the option of trading in an 
asset claim for a general bank claim, should the purchased asset default. Hence 
securitization with recourse is viewed as means of issuing sequential claims on the bank’s 
loan assets, yielding the same risk-sharing benefits of multiclass securities. That off-
                                                 
27
 See also Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) and Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008) on the accounting for 
securitization under FASB140. 
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balance sheet activity which explicitly creates a contingent asset or liability stands in 
sharp contrast to loan sale activity, a no-recourse, off- balance sheet contract that grew 
dramatically in volume in the 1980s. Gorton and Pennacchi (1989, 1995) argue that loan 
sale activity could not have been achieved unless it contained implicit guarantees, 
allowing loan buyers to sell the loans back to the bank if the underlying borrower 
underperforms.  
In an ABS deal, recourse can be thought of as an agreement between a 
securitizer/sponsor and investors such that the sponsor guarantees the performance of the 
securitized assets. Since any explicit agreement to support an underperforming deal 
beyond contractual obligation will violate the “true sale” assumption of FASB140 (which 
allowed the assets to be moved off-balance sheet), these guarantees are stated implicitly. 
The sponsor can provide implicit recourse by (1) selling assets to the SPE at a premium 
(2) buying assets from the SPE at a discount (3) exchanging performing assets for non-
performing assets (4) extending credit enhancement beyond what was explicitly 
contracted. 
Calomiris and Mason (2004) provide a theoretical rational for the existence of 
implicit recourse in ABS deals along the lines of efficient contracting. In their view, the 
combination of excessively high regulatory capital requirements, severe adverse selection 
problem of valuing credit card (CC) receivables, and strict institutional prohibition on 
non-bank CC intermediation, makes bank securitization with recourse the optimal 
solution to finance CC receivables. Furthermore, such a voluntary contracting mechanism 
signals the deal’s credit quality and allows sponsors to maintain their reputation for 
consistent credit quality, while enjoying the benefits of off-balance sheet financing.  
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 Gorton and Souleles (2006) take a similar view, noting that investors in CC ABS 
deals face two problems: the moral hazard problem, because investors cannot verify the 
effort level exerted by the sponsor in monitoring the underlying asset, and the strategic 
adverse selection problem, because the sponsor has an incentive to securitize risky assets. 
While the moral hazard problem is always present in securitization, the sponsor can 
mitigate the adverse selection problem by committing to subsidize a poorly performing 
ABS deal through implicit recourse. Furthermore, the authors show that the ability to 
provide implicit recourse is directly related to the sponsor’s financial position, as 
indicated from the relation between the yield on the senior securitized tranches and the 
creditworthiness (measured by the senior unsecured bond ratings) of the sponsor. 
Since implicit recourse cannot be formally stated, it is not a coincidence that only 
few events were ever documented, and on the rare occasion that implicit recourse is 
provided, it is done so in a subtle manner. Higgins and Mason (2004) identify only 17 
recourse events by 10 banks relating to CC ABS deals between 1987 and 2001.28 Even 
though these events violated FASB140, regulators did not force the banks to move assets 
back on-balance sheet, and the authors show that in general the market reacted positively 
to the recourse announcements. Vermilyea et al. (2008) use a more subtle approach to 
identify implicit recourse. Fraud losses on securitized CC-ABS are incurred by the deal’s 
sponsor, whereas credit losses are borne by ABS investors, hence the classification of 
losses provides an avenue for implicit recourse. Vermilyea et al. (2008) find that deal 
underperformance is associated with fraud losses reported by the sponsoring bank. 
                                                 
28
 The implicit recourse literature focuses mainly on ABS deals backed by credit card receivables. These 
assets that have no fixed maturity, uncertain chargeoffs, and unpredictable payment rates, force the sponsor 
into an ongoing relationship with the SPE to maintain the collateral’s outstanding principal amount at a 
predetermined level. Hence implicit recourse is more natural in such settings. 
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It is important to note that we do not observe whether our sample firms actually 
support their deals, yet the downgrade announcement puts the sponsor in a position where 
honoring implicit recourse and protecting its reputation, given its financial condition, 
might be necessary.  
 
2.4.  Rating agencies and the ABS market 
 
 Rating agencies perform a unique role in the securitization market, and their 
involvement goes far and beyond of just simply providing passive credit-quality 
certification. Instead, rating agencies take on a more active approach, controlling not only 
ratings, but also determining product design standards and security structure (Riddiough 
and Chiang, 2003). The 2005 report by the Committee on Global Financial System 
explains the role of CRAs in light of an ABS deal’s unique rating requirement: 
…tranche rating reflects a judgment about both the credit quality of the 
underlying collateral asset pool and the extent of credit support that must 
be provided through the transaction’s structure in order for the tranche to 
receive the rating targeted by the deal’s arrangers. Deal origination thus 
involves obtaining implicit structuring advice by the rating agencies… 
[and] iterative dialogue with the agencies…This contrasts with traditional 
bond ratings, where pre-rating discussions between issuers and agencies 
play a more limited role. (p. 2).  
 
The intimate involvement of rating agencies is not limited to the securitization 
process itself, but is also evident before hand, as sponsors engage in “ratings shopping”, a 
process by which CRAs estimate how many AAA-rated bonds can be issued against an 
underlying pool of assets (Calomiris, 2008; Caprio, Kunt, and Kane, 2008). In fact, 
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Mason and Rosner (2007b) suggest that rating agencies can be considered as 
underwriters, due their influence on the marketability of a given ABS structure.  
Regulation has also contributed to the pivotal role of rating agencies. Capital 
requirements for depository institutions are based on their assets’ credit ratings, and 
generally, FIs are bound by their ability to hold risky debts. Calomiris (2008) notes that:  
By granting enormous regulatory power to rating agencies, the 
government encouraged rating agencies to compete in relaxing the cost of 
regulation, allowing them to realize huge profits from fees that they could 
earn from underestimating risk. (p. 31).  
 
The practice of underestimating risk through grade inflation was concentrated in 
securitized products and was already evident in the early 1990s (Cantor and Packer, 
1994). Moreover, institutional investors, who due to regulation can only invest in highly 
rated debt, encouraged grade inflation to make the menu of high-yielding securities 
available for them to purchase. Given the complicated task of rating an ABS transaction, 
CRAs could charge higher fees than those charged on standard, more traditional 
corporate debt ratings, and the demand-driven grade inflation was accompanied with 
record profits.29 
In conclusion, the rating agencies’ significant role in structuring ABS deals along 
with increased regulatory power lead to a demand-driven grade inflation. It was 
accompanied by a fast-growing, lucrative product area generating substantial fee-income. 
Since a financially troubled securitizer is (1) less likely to subsidies an underperforming 
ABS deal and (2) less likely to securitize future deals with the rating agency (depriving it 
of rating’s fees-income), we conjecture that rating agencies, faced with a downgrade 
                                                 
29
 In 2006 alone, Moody’s generated $667 million from structured finance ratings, representing 44% of 
revenues that year. Since S&P is a unit of McGraw-Hill Cos., data on fee-income generated of ABS-deal 
ratings is not available.  
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decision, might not treat an ABS deal independently from its ultimate parent/sponsor 
financial performance.  
 
3.  Data 
 
 We obtain data on ABS deal-downgrades from two sources, Moody’s and S&P. A 
typical observation includes information on its downgrade date, deal and tranche size, 
sale/maturity date, old/new rating, collateral type, country of issuance, and the reason for 
the downgrade.30 In addition, it includes unique identifiers such as a deal’s cusip number 
and series/issuer name. Depending on collateral type, a typical ABS deal might have 
anywhere between 3 to 50 tranches, and as such a downgrade can be on a single or 
multiple tranches of the same deal. Furthermore, both agencies can downgrade the same 
tranche or tranches on the same date, or different tranches of the same deal on the same 
date. Thus for any given date, we should construct our sample such that each tranche 
represents one deal that is associated with an ultimate parent/sponsor (see Appendix I for 
detailed steps on sample construction).  
Both rating agencies report over 8,300 tranche-downgrades between November 
1986 and May 2005 (5,881 by Moody’s and 2,461 by S&P). However, roughly 54% of 
the Moody’s downgrades are for CDOs or tobacco settlement tranches issued by 
Federal/State agencies, for which we cannot obtain data on the tranches’ ultimate parents. 
Screening out these observations reduces our sample to 5,138 tranches.  
                                                 
30
 The most frequent reason for a Moody’s downgrade is a weak deal performance, representing over 60% 
of total deal downgrades. Another reason is a downgrade of the deal’s credit enhancement, as in the case of 
JCPenny Master Credit Card Trust Series C. On April 30th, 1990, Moody’s downgraded that deal because 
the long-term debt rating of Credit Swiss, the bank which provided the letter of credit to the JCPenny deal, 
was downgraded earlier that year.  
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Our analysis hinges on the identification of the ultimate parent 
(sponsor/originator) of each downgraded tranche. However, in our data the reported 
issuer in most cases is not the ultimate parent company but a bankruptcy-remote 
subsidiary. Usually, such a subsidiary is created by the ultimate parent company solely 
for the purpose of securitization, and as such will have no financial data available. To 
overcome this issue, we use Moody’s Investors Services database and search for each 
tranche’s ultimate parent.  
Identifying the ultimate parent does not always guarantee a valid transaction. 
There are instances in which a downgrade occurs while the deal’s originator (the tranche 
issuer) is either no longer in existence (it was acquired or went bankrupt) or has already 
sold the deal. For these observations we identify the ultimate parent as the parent’s 
acquirer or the deal’s purchaser.31 In other instances the downgraded tranches are issued 
by a conduit, which purchases and securitizes (for a fee) assets of smaller institutions. For 
such conduit-downgrade tranches an ultimate parent cannot be identified. Finally, we 
require each parent to have data on CRSP and Compustat for at least one year prior to the 
downgrade. Overall, we are able to identify the ultimate parents of 1,604 tranches.  
Since a typical ABS tranche is rated by at least two agencies, our data includes 
some downgrades by both Moody’s and S&P that occur on the same day. Furthermore, 
there are observations in which multiple tranches of the same deal are downgraded on the 
same date.32 Eliminating such cases reduces our sample to 392 tranches/deals. Finally, 
                                                 
31
 Consider the case of Conseco Inc. Any downgrade of a Conseco deal until August 2002 is accredited to 
Conseco Inc. However, since General Electric Co. (GE) bought Conseco Financial Corp on March 2003, 
any downgrade post that event is accredited to GE. 
32
 For instance, on March 12, 2004, Moody’s downgraded 3 tranches from the same deal, Global Franchise 
Trust 1998-I (ultimate parent - Deutsche Bank AG.). We include in the sample the largest downgraded 
tranche (Class A-2) of $115.1 million, representing about 23% of that deal. 
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since we employ an event study methodology, we keep observations of the same parent 
as long as they are at least one month apart. That requirement reduces our sample to 236 
deals. The announcement date is defined as the earlier of (1) the date supplied by the 
rating agencies, or (2) the date on which a news story about the deal-downgrade 
appeared. To that end, we employ Factiva to verify the accuracy of each reported 
downgrade and that there are no confounding events.33 That final screening reduces our 
sample size to 217 deal-downgrades by 57 ultimate parents.  
Figure 1 traces the deal-downgrade distribution over time comparing the 
downgrade universe with our sample. Most downgrades occur in the latter stages of this 
time period. Between 1998 and 2005, Moody’s (S&P) downgraded about 98% (90%) of 
its deals. Our sample is fairly similar, including about 80% of the downgrades during that 
period. The year with the most downgrades is 2004 representing almost 24% of our final 
sample.  
Segregating the sample according to the underlying collateral type, we observe in 
Table1 that manufactured housing (MH) accounts for 28% of total deal downgrades. 
Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), home equity loans (HEL), and air craft 
leases account for 20%, 12% and 10%, respectively. Auto loans, credit cards, and 
franchise leases are about 5% each. Splitting up the sample by the ultimate parent’s two-
digit SIC code reveals that the most frequently downgraded deals are sponsored by non-
depository (SIC code 61) and depository institutions (SIC code 60), accounting for 30% 
and 15% respectively.  
                                                 
33
 There are 9 deal-downgrades that occur within two days (-2, +2) of an ultimate parent downgrade. Even 
though they constitute a contaminated event, we do not discard these observations as they are consistent 
with our premise that rating agencies might not treat the ABS deal separately from the parent’s financial 
condition. The following event study results are robust to the exclusion of these 9 observations. They are 
also robust when we conduct the analysis on the contaminated samples of 236 and 392 observations.   
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Overall, 65% of the downgraded deals are sponsored by financial institutions (1 
digit SIC code 6). The remaining deals are mainly sponsored by ultimate parents from the 
following industries: 10% by non-classifiable establishments (SIC code 99), such as 
Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric Co.,  8% by the transportation equipment 
industry (SIC 37, firms such as Ford and GM), 4% by the transportation services industry 
(SIC 47, GATX Corp), 3.6% by the lumber and wood products industry (SIC 24, 
Maxxam Inc.), and 2% by the air transportation (SIC 45, UAL Corp) and automotive 
repair (SIC 75, Avis Budget Group) industries, respectively.  
Sample summary statistics are presented Table 2. A typical parent of a 
downgraded deal has an average market capitalization of $32.1 billion, while its average 
book-to-market value of equity (BME) in year-end prior to the downgrade is 0.67.34 The 
typical downgraded tranche size of $92 million represents about 29% of the total 
securitized deal size, whereas the mean downgrade of 3 grades corresponds to an average 
post event credit rating of BB+. Furthermore, the average number of downgraded deals 
per parent is 3.80, while the average number of days between any two consecutive 
downgrades related to the same parent is 294.35 Finally, the average number of days 
between the deal’s issuance and downgrade is 1,291.  
The fact that, on average, a downgrade occurs within 3.5 years of the deal’s 
inception is not a coincidence. An important aspect of a typical ABS deal which provides 
protection to investors (in addition to the senior/subordinated structure) is credit 
                                                 
34
 There are two ultimate parents (accounting for 4 deals) with a year-end negative book value of equity 
(BVE). One deal by United Airlines was downgraded while it reported a negative BVE in 2002. Three 
deals by Maxxam Inc. were downgraded while it reported a negative BVE between 2002 and 2004. 
35
 IndyMac has a total of 19 deal-downgrades where the underlying collateral is either sub-prime RMBS or 
MH. Between 4/26/1999 and 4/22/2005, IndyMac experienced on average a downgrade once every 3 
months. Dropping the IndyMac observations from the analysis does not change the results. Washington 
Mutual had the longest difference between any two consecutive downgrades. Its first deal downgrade on 
March 3rd, 1995, was followed by a second one almost 10 years later, on December 21st, 2004. 
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enhancement (CE), which appears in two forms: overcollateralization, achieved when the 
deal’s assets (collateral balance) exceed liabilities (bond balance), and excess spread, 
which is the difference between the interest paid by the collateral borrowers and the 
coupon paid to bond holders (net of servicing and administrative fees).36 Since CE is a 
function of collateral performance, it accumulates during the life of the transaction until it 
reaches a predetermined level, and is usually available to investors during the first three 
years, after which it is paid out of the transaction to the residual holders (usually the 
deal’s sponsor). Hence if an ABS deal performs well in its first three years, CE (and its 
associated protection) is no longer available afterwards, and deteriorating performance 
leads to a downgrade.  
The analysis which follows is conducted along two categories. The first one 
distinguishes between FIs (1 digit SIC code 6) and non-FIs, since the former are by far 
the most frequent securitizers (FIs account for 75% of the reported ABS deals on the 
SDC database from 1970-2006). The second category controls for the ultimate parent’s 
financial condition, which directly impacts its ability to support an underperforming deal 
or to securitize repeatedly (depriving CRAs of substantial fees, if the parent cannot 
securitize due to its underperformance). The ultimate parent’s financial condition is based 
on whether the parent is downgraded within six months of the ABS downgrade. Data on 
an ultimate parent downgrade comes from two sources: the S&P Credit Ratings database 
and an online news search on Factiva (for those parents that we cannot match with the 
S&P database). A parent downgrade is defined as an event that occurs within six months 
                                                 
36
 In addition to over-collateralization and excess spread, monoline insurers provide secondary credit 
enhancement by guaranteeing the senior most tranches. Yet their representation in the ABS market has 
declined considerably. In 1999, almost 30% of ABS deals included an insurer, while by 2003, only 10% 
had one. 
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of an ABS deal downgrade, and includes either an actual ratings downgrade or an 
announcement in which the parent was put on the S&P negative credit watch list. 
 
4. Investors’ Treatment of ABS Deals 
 
4. 1. Downgrade announcements 
 
 To investigate whether the market considers ABS deals to be separated from their 
sponsors, we conduct an event study around the date in which rating agencies announce a 
deal downgrade. The market model is used to estimate market model parameters for an 
event window of two and three days, with the CRSP value-weighted return as the market 
return. The estimation period runs for 250 days, and ends 11 days before the 
announcement.  
 We report the event study results in Table 3. For the full sample, the negative and 
significant two-day CAR of -0.81% (p value=0.016) indicates that ABS deals are not 
independent of their sponsors. The (-1, +1) CAR of -1.14% is significant as well at the 5 
percent level. The statistically significant wealth losses are similar to those reported in the 
corporate finance literature, regarding the announcement returns to firms’ debt 
downgrades. The negative market reaction to an ABS deal downgrade not only provides 
evidence in support of the “true sale” assumption violation (FASB140), but also indicates 
that the risks of asset ownership still reside with the sponsor.37  
                                                 
37
 A compelling explanation for the negative market reaction, which undermines the true sale assumption 
violation, relates to originators’ practice of retaining the first loss position in their securitized deals. 
Financial institutions previously retained the junior tranches of their originated deals, the ones with the 
highest information asymmetry, to help align their origination incentives and alleviate the moral hazard 
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 Segregating announcement returns by firm type and ultimate parent downgrade 
provides a clear view of investors’ perceptions. First, downgrades of ABS deals 
originated by financial institutions account for the significant results, as the two (three) 
day CAR of -1.09% (-1.74%) is significant at the five (one) percent level). Second, a deal 
downgrade that occurs within half a year of a parent’s downgrade is informative as well, 
since the CAR of -1.28% (-1.85%) is significant at the five (ten) percent level. Panel B of 
Table 3 provides the intersection of these two breakdowns. The majority of downgrades 
(116) are for ABS deals originated by FIs that did not experience a downgrade, yet the 24 
ABS downgrades sponsored by downgraded FIs command on average the most negative 
three-day CAR of 4.48% (p-value=0.036).  
The above results are in accordance with the theoretical rational and empirical 
evidence on implicit recourse. Since the ability to provide implicit recourse is directly 
related to the sponsor’s financial position (Gorton and Souleles, 2006), and since FIs, 
which are the most frequent securitizers are also the most likely candidates to provide 
implicit recourse (Higgins and Mason, 2004), the market reacts most negatively to 
downgraded ABS deals that are sponsored by downgraded FIs.  
 
 
4.2.  Additional evidence on market discipline –post downgrade ABS activity 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
issues faced by investors. However, starting in January 2002, regulatory changes raised minimum capital 
requirements for banks which retain those junior stakes, discouraging them from holding those assets. As 
such, one would expect the market reaction to be negative and significant for downgrades that occurred 
prior to 2002. However, the market reactions for the 89 downgrades in the pre-2002 period are not 
significant, whereas the market reactions for the 128 downgrades from 2002 onwards are large (-1.09% and 
-1.40% for the 2 and 3 day event windows, respectively) and significant at the 5 percent level. 
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 The significant losses in shareholders’ wealth upon the announcement of an ABS 
downgrade may not be the only means by which investors react. Higgins and Mason 
(2004) document that firms engaged in subsidization of their failed SPEs (via implicit 
recourse) face long delays before returning to the securitization market. Such evidence is 
in line with a “punishment period,” where investors punish the sponsor by withholding 
investment in its ABS deals for a certain period if its previous deal performed poorly 
(Gorton and Souleles, 2006). If market discipline is well functioning, we would expect 
the ultimate parent of a downgraded ABS deal to face a similar exclusion period, and that 
the parent’s ABS issuance activity will be sensitive to its credit quality.   
 We examine market access for ultimate parents by comparing the average time 
between ABS transaction issuances in the pre- and post- downgrade periods. We match 
our ultimate parents with their ABS activity as reported by the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC). We require each parent to have issuance data prior to an ABS deal 
downgrade, and data on at least one ABS transaction after the deal downgrade. Out of our 
217 deals by 57 parents, we are able to match 89 deals by 25 parents with SDC. Next, we 
calculate the average time, in days, between each consecutive ABS issuance in the pre- 
downgrade period, and compare that average with the difference (in days) between the 
first issuance post-downgrade and the last issuance pre-downgrade. For instance, SDC 
reports 8 transactions by Maryland National Corp. (MNC) before its ABS downgrade on 
June 6, 1991, with an average time of 152 days between each consecutive ABS deal. The 
last pre-downgrade reported deal is on November 2, 1990. The first post-downgrade 
reported deal is on September 18, 1992. The difference between these two of transactions 
of 676 days is compared with the pre event issuance frequency of 152 days. 
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 In Table 4 (columns 1-3) we show the comparison of the pre- and post- 
downgrade market access results. Parents of downgraded deals (i.e., “bad” securitizers) 
face significant delays returning to the securitization market. For the full sample we 
observe that the average time laps between issues around the downgrade averages about 
five times the interval between issues prior to the downgrade. That delay is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.039). Delays in market access are also 
observed for the two subgroups of FIs and downgraded parents, where FIs face a 
“punishment period” that averages over five times the interval between issues prior to the 
downgrade (p value= 0.087). 
 Additional evidence on market discipline is presented in panel C of Table 4. We 
repeat the analysis, only this time we match the downgraded deal type with the same 
issuance deal type. For example, if the MNC downgraded deal’s collateral is credit cards, 
we include only the issuance of credit card ABS deals by MNC, as reported by SDC. 
Similarly to the previous full sample results, ultimate parents face significant delays in 
issuance activity post downgrade. The average time laps between issues around the 
downgrade averages about seven times (p-value = 0.005) the interval between issues prior 
to the downgrade.  
 Overall, the significantly negative market reaction to ABS downgrades, along 
with abnormal delays in issuance cycle support the view that investors treat ABS deals as 
an integral part of their ultimate parents, and that financial markets were functioning prior 
to the 2007 financial meltdown, as parents’ ability to securitize depended on their credit 
quality. It is important to note that the documented exclusion periods represent 
conservative estimations, since our SDC matches are likely to be for the largest most 
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frequent securitizers, which almost always return to the ABS market. Smaller, less 
frequent securitizers (that do not have sufficient data on SDC) are likely to be excluded 
for longer periods (if not forever) following their ABS deal downgrades.  
  
4.3. Could investors distinguish “bad” securitizers from “good” ones? 
 
 The fact that ultimate parents/sponsors of downgraded ABS deals return to the 
market only after experiencing significant delays in their issuance schedule provides 
compelling evidence in favor of market discipline. Yet this finding is incomplete, as it 
ignores any potential changes that might affect the overall securitization market. Our 
premise that investors punish “bad” securitizers will be more conclusive if “good” 
securitizers, i.e. those that did not experience a deal downgrade, do not face similar 
delays.  Hence a comparison between the issuance cycles of “good” and “bad” 
securitizers is warranted.  
 The data on “good” securitizers comes from SDC. We construct a sample such 
that all active “good” securitizers have at least two deals prior to a downgrade, and at 
least one deal post-downgrade. To avoid discrepancy, we require the issuance activity for 
the “good” securitizers to be within the issuance range of the “bad” securitizers. For 
instance, Advanta Corp. experienced an ABS downgrade on August 13, 1990. Its earliest 
reported issuance on SDC is on March 25, 1988, while the first issuance after the 
downgrade was on August 22, 1990. Thus the sample of “good” securitizers includes all 
ABS issuers between these two dates. Once the sample is obtained, we follow the above 
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procedure and test if the industry (the good securitizers) experiences similar delays in 
issuance cycles.  
 The results presented in columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 complement the conclusion 
that markets were functioning prior to the recent financial turmoil (we do not conduct the 
analysis for the sample of delays based on asset type since there are not enough industry 
matches). Overall, the ABS industry does not exhibit major changes in its issuance 
cycles. “Good” securitizers access the market on average once every 48 days, and even 
though the post downgrade issuance frequency goes up to once every 61 days (p 
value=0.053), such a short delay is negligible compared with the significant delays 
exhibited by “bad” securitizers. A breakdown of the sample to its subgroups presents a 
similar pattern. Finally, the adjusted delay differences between “bad” and “good” 
securitizers (final column of Table 4) remain significant as well.  
Thus our results are robust to any systematic changes that might have affected the 
issuance activity of the ABS industry. There is an indication that investors do not treat the 
ABS market in a systematic fashion, since “good” securitizers do not exhibit delays in 
issuance activity, and that investors are able to accurately identify and punish “bad” 
securitizers.  
 
4.4. Punishment period: demand or supply driven? 
 
 Another explanation that undermines market discipline, as indicated through a 
punishment period, is that ABS sponsors experience delays not because investors are 
unwilling to provide funds, but rather because sponsors do not have securitizable assets. 
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In other words, it is the sponsors’ inability to supply collateral rather than investors’ lack 
of demand that causes delays in ABS issuance activity.  
If delays are supply driven, then we would observe contraction in securitizable 
assets during the punishment period. The definition of securitizable assets depends on the 
parents’ identity. For depository institutions, we define such assets as the sum of real 
estate, agriculture, and consumer loans, and the data is obtained from Call Reports. For 
non-depository institutions, we define securitizable assets as accounts receivables, and 
the data is obtained from Compustat.  
We report the results in Table 4B. For the full sample, the average (median) 
quarterly change in securitizable assets of 10.11% (3.43%) during the punishment period 
is significant at the 1 (1) percent level. Positive and statistically significant changes are 
also documented for FIs, for parents that do not experience a downgrade, and for 
depository and non-depository institutions. All of the documented changes are highly 
significant. Overall, these results are consistent with a demand-driven punishment period 
since there is no evidence of contraction in the level of securitizable assets.  
  
4.5.  Cross sectional regression analysis  
 
 To investigate other potential determinants of the negative announcement returns 
and the post-event market access activity, we estimate regression models controlling for 
the following variables: FI, a dummy variable =1 if the sponsor is a financial institution 
(1 digit SIC=6), Parent Downgrade, a dummy variable =1 if the sponsor was 
downgraded within half a year of the deal’s downgrade, Risk, firm’s systemic risk 
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defined as the difference between firm’s total and specific risk. Total risk is the standard 
deviation of daily stock return one year prior to ABS downgrade (excluding the 10 days 
prior to the event) and specific risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the 
market model regression, Size, measured as the natural log of market value of equity, 
BBB rating, a dummy=1 if the new deal’s rating is BBB or lower, and Tranche-to-deal, 
to control for the relative significance of the downgraded tranche. In addition, we include 
the interaction terms FI*(Parent downgrade) and FI*(Risk). 
 The first set of regression results is reported in Table 5 and relates the 2-day CAR 
with the above control variables. We cluster standard errors by firm and year as there are 
some firms with multiple downgrades within the same year. Larger firms experience 
lower declines in their market value given the positive coefficient on Size (p-
value=0.087), yet riskier FIs face significant shareholders’ wealth destruction as the 
negative coefficient on the interaction term FI*risk is significant at the 5 percent level.  
The second set of regression results relates the “punishment period” following the 
ABS downgrade with the various control variables. The coefficient on FI (-1.842) is 
highly significant at the 1 percent level indicating that FIs return faster to the ABS market 
presumably because they are larger and relative to non-FIs tend to securitize more 
frequently. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the Parent Downgrade dummy is negative as 
well, though only marginally significant at the 10 percent level (p-value=0.061). Finally, 
financially weak FIs face longer delays given the positive and significant coefficient on 
the interaction term FI*(Parent Downgrade), suggesting that investors are aware of their 
limited ability to support underperforming ABS deals.  
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In conclusion, there is evidence that rating agencies provide the market with 
valuable information, and although ABS transactions are originally designated to be off–
balance sheet, their downgrades command significant costs to their sponsors. Such costs 
not only affect shareholders’ wealth, but also impact the parents’ securitization activity 
and potentially limiting liquidity.  
 
5. Rating Agencies’ Treatment of ABS Deals  
 
5.1. Pre-event stock and operating performance 
 
We turn to investigate whether rating agencies, in their decision to downgrade 
ABS deals, treat them separately from their parents’ performance. Since a financially 
troubled sponsor is (1) less likely to subsidies an underperforming ABS deal and (2) less 
likely to securitize future deals with the rating agency (depriving CRAs from future 
rating fees), CRAs might not consider an ABS deal separately from its sponsor. To that 
end we study whether deteriorating financial conditions of ultimate parents precede deal 
downgrades. We hypothesize that if rating agencies treat deals independently, then 
parents’ pre-downgrade performance should not matter. More specifically, we would 
expect poor pre-downgrade performance only when ABS downgrades coincide with 
parent downgrades. 
In order to investigate the long term pre event performance, we calculate buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHAR). First, we obtain the buy-and-hold return (BHR) for our 
ultimate parents such that  
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where Rit is the ith firm’s return on the tth day, and Ti is the number of trading days in the 
period following the downgrade. Once the BHR is obtained, we calculate the abnormal 
BHR as the difference between the ultimate parent and its matched peer  
Peer
i
Parent
ii BHRBHRBHAR −=  
Defining peers is crucial in long term analysis. Following the literature standards, 
our match is on industry (4 digit SIC code), size (market value equity) and book-to-
market equity. We choose a peer within the same industry that has the smallest sum of 
absolute percentage difference in size and book-to-market equity, using financial data 
from the year preceding the downgrade. We complement the pre-event stock performance 
analysis by investigating the quarterly operating performance of ABS sponsors leading to 
and right after the downgrade, using the same matched sample as in the BHAR analysis. 
The sample size is reduced since we include only one downgrade by any sponsor 
occurring on the same quarter.  
 We present the mean and median long-term pre downgrade BHAR results in 
Table 6. On average, the ultimate parent underperforms its peer by 9% in the year prior to 
the ABS deal downgrade. The three year pre-event underperformance is more severe, at 
about 20%. The evidence for the full sample suggests that long-term stock performance 
might be related to ABS downgrades. The sub-samples reveal that the negative BHARs 
are driven by non-FIs and downgraded parents, which underperform their respective 
benchmarks by about 22% in the year prior to the ABS downgrade. The weak stock 
performance is evident even three years prior to the deal’s downgrade, where non-FIs and 
downgraded parents experience BHARs of -46% and -57%, respectively.   
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 In panel B of Table 6 we present the intersection between these two sub groups. 
While the weak stock performance of non-FIs is present regardless of a parent 
downgrade, the case is not the same for FIs, where the weak pre-event stock performance 
is only observable when the parent is downgraded. FIs that are not downgraded do not 
underperform relative to their matched peers in the period leading to the ABS downgrade. 
This is an indication of greater transparency for an ABS deal that is sponsored by a FI, 
suggesting that the downgrade is due to a poor deal performance, rather than a weak 
financial position of the parent. This is in sharp contrast to an ABS deal that is sponsored 
by non-FI. When such a deal is downgraded it is associated with the parent’s 
underperformance, irrespective of a parent downgrade. 
 We complement the evidence on the pre-downgrade stock underperformance by 
examining sponsors’ quarterly operating performance and capital ratios. These results are 
reported in Table 7 where adjusted measures correspond to the difference between a 
sample firm and its matched peer. In this analysis we limit the sample to include only one 
downgrade by each parent in any given quarter.  
From panel A of Table 7 we learn that even though sponsor’s raw ROA, ROE and 
capital ratio remain relatively unchanged in the four quarters leading to the ABS 
downgrade, the adjusted ROA and capital ratio are significantly weaker prior to the 
downgrade. Furthermore, the deterioration in the adjusted ROA and ROE measures is 
significant throughout the period. Panels B and C indicate that the underperformance is 
particularly sever for non-FIs and downgraded parents. Finally, the subgroups 
intersection performance measures and capital ratio results in panel D of Table 7 are 
consistent with the BHARs results reported in panel B of Table 6. These suggest that 
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deals sponsored by FIs are downgraded irrespective of the sponsor’s performance, 
whereas for deals sponsored by non-FIs, deteriorating financial conditions are present 
prior to the ABS downgrade. 
 
5.2. Robustness 
 
 The documented underperformance of non-FIs that sponsor downgraded ABS 
deals is relative to a matched sample, and as such may be driven by our selection process. 
To overcome this potential bias, we construct portfolios of all sponsors that experienced 
ABS downgrades, and follow their performance for a period of one- and three-years prior 
to the downgrade. Each sponsor’s stock remains in the portfolio until one day before the 
downgrade date. Abnormal daily return performance is calculated as the intercept,α , 
from a Fama-French (1993) three factor model such that  
tttrfmtrfpt hHMLsSMBRRRR εβα +++−+=− )()(  
where ptR  is the return on the portfolio of sample firms in day t, rfR is the date t risk-free 
rate, mtR is the date t return on the value-weighted market index, tSMB  is the date t return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of small-cap stock minus the date t return on a value-
weighted portfolio of large-cap stocks, tHML  is the date t return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of high book-to-market stock minus the date t return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
 We report the estimated intercepts for our sample firms’ portfolio abnormal 
returns in Table 8. Sponsors’ daily returns average -0.009% (p =0.001) and -0.022% for 
the one- and three-year periods respectively. Sub-sample analysis indicates that FIs, non-
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FIs, and downgraded parents underperform significantly. The sub-sample intersection 
results are consistent with the documented BHAR results. The weak stock performance 
of non-FIs is present regardless of a parent downgrade, as the average daily abnormal 
return in the three years leading to the deal downgrade ( -0.01%) is highly significant (p = 
0.000). Such poor performance is not exhibited by FIs, where the weak pre-event stock 
performance, as with the BHAR, is only observable when the parent is downgraded.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The structure of an ABS deal stipulates that the securitized assets are moved off-
balance sheet in accordance with the “true sale” assumption envisaged by FASB 140, and 
as a result, the deal’s sponsor maintains neither the benefits nor the associated risks of 
owning those assets. The results presented in this paper contradict that assumption. By 
studying the effect of an ABS deal downgrade on its ultimate parent, we show that risk 
resides with the parent. The significant wealth losses following the downgrade 
announcements are consistent with the view that investors treat ABS deals as an integral 
part of their sponsors, and when weak performance leads to downgrades, investors react 
and expect the ultimate parents to support their deals.  
The market’s disciplinary role is not limited to a significant loss in shareholders 
wealth, but is also manifested through a significant delay in the post-downgrade 
securitization activity.  Such a “punishment period” is not observed for sponsors of ABS 
deals that did not suffer downgrades. On the other hand, Sponsors of downgraded deals 
experience long delays in their ABS issuance cycle. Similar delays have been previously 
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documented for sponsors who provide implicit recourse to their underperforming credit 
card ABS deals. Overall, these findings support the notion that a sponsor’s ability to 
securitize depends on its credit quality, and that in fact, investors can distinguish a “bad” 
securitizer from a “good” one as the latter’s ability to securitize is not hindered.   
Our data also allows us to explore the motivation behind some of the downgraded 
deals.  Since rating agencies serve as the de facto regulators of the ABS market and are 
intimately involved with the issuance process, they can earn substantial fees from 
structuring and rating those deals. Hence we conjecture that an ABS downgrade might 
not be independent of the ultimate parent’s financial position since a financially troubled 
sponsor is (1) less likely to support an underperforming ABS deal and (2) less likely to 
securitize future deals with the rating agency (depriving rating agencies from expected 
fees). Our results confirm that conjecture as the long-term pre-downgrade stock 
performance of non-FIs that sponsor ABS deals is significantly negative. Deteriorating 
conditions are also observable in adjusted operating performance measures and capital 
ratios around the ABS downgrade. Thus rating agencies, just like investors, treat ABS 
deals as an integral part of their sponsors.  
 The recent economic crisis raises numerous proposals for changes in regulation, 
and brings into question the complex risk-shifting activities FIs were involved with, 
which evidently lead to the unprecedented financial meltdown in the summer of 2007. 
Proponents of stricter regulation stress that the proliferation of opaque securities financed 
through off-balance sheet transactions, has made transparency almost nonexistent and 
risk relocation questionable (Stiglitz, 2008; Krugman, 2008).  
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Yet tougher regulation is not always warranted. Financial historians point to the 
significant economic costs that were generated by the post-Depression regulatory 
changes. Chief among those are the separation of commercial and investment banks, the 
establishment of deposit insurance, and the entrenchment of entry barriers across regions 
(Calomiris, 2000). Moreover, tougher regulation that ignores market forces distorts 
supervisors’ incentives and is bound to be inefficient (Caprio, Kunt, and Kane, 2008). If 
supervisors can incorporate in the monitoring process market signals related to a 
securitizer’s risk, specifically if the signals identify an overlooked problem, then the 
supervisors’ ability to react promptly and correctly is enhanced. Our results indicate that 
securitizers are not shielded from the market’s disciplinary forces, and as such, regulatory 
reforms should consider incorporating ABS downgrades and link on-and-off balance 
sheet conditions in the supervisory process.  
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Figure 1: Yearly ABS Downgrade Frequencies 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Panel A: sample breakdown by underlying collateral type 
 
Collateral Type Frequency % 
   
Manufactured housing 61 28.44 
RMBS subprime 43 19.72 
Home equity loans (HEL) 26 11.93 
Aircraft leases 22 10.09 
Auto loans 13 5.96 
Credit cards 12 5.50 
Franchise loans 11 5.05 
Equipment leases 5 2.29 
Trade receivables  4 1.83 
Rental car  4 1.83 
Recreational vehicle 3 1.38 
Small business loans 3 1.38 
Floorplans 1 0.46 
Revolving loans 1 0.46 
Trade receivables 1 0.46 
Other 7 3.21 
   
Total 217 100 
 
Panel B: sample breakdown by Industry 
 
2 digit SIC Industry Classification SIC code Freq. % 
    
Non-depository Credit Institutions 61 67 30.88 
Depository institutions 60 34 15.67 
Non-classifiable Establishments 99 22 10.14 
Security & commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges & services 62 19 8.76 
Transportation equipment 37 17 7.83 
Holding and other investment offices 67 15 6.91 
Transportation services 47 9 4.15 
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 24 8 3.69 
Transportation by air 45 5 2.30 
Insurance carriers 63 5 2.30 
Automotive repair, services, and parking 75 4 1.84 
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 42 3 1.38 
Chemicals and allied products 28 2 0.92 
Ind. & Comm. Machinery and Computer equipment 35 2 0.92 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 49 2 0.92 
Miscellaneous retail 59 2 0.92 
General merchandise stores 53 1 0.46 
    
Total  217 100% 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for 217 ABS deal-downgrades by either Moody’s or S&P between 1986 and 2005, for which the 
deal’s ultimate parent is identified on CRSP and Compustat. An ultimate parent is either the deal’s originator or the deal’s 
acquirer, in case the originator went bankrupt or was acquired prior to the deal’s downgrade. A total of 57 parents account 
for the 217 deals. Multiple deal downgrades of the same parent are within at least one month apart (20 trading days). 
Market value of equity (MVE) and Book to market equity (BME) are from year end prior to downgrade. Days-to-
downgrade is the difference between the downgrade date and the deal’s origination date. 
 N Mean Median Min Max STD 
MVE (in 2005 $millions) 140 32,155 2,572 13.86 430,643.21 76,446.75 
Book-to-market equity 140 0.67 0.64 -28.84 7.26 2.96 
       
Tranche (in 2005 $millions) 217 92.92 28.44 0.76 1772.39 190.93 
Deal (in 2005 $millions) 217 427.48 289.11 13.84 1772.39 376.14 
Tranche / deal 217 0.2897 0.0876 0.0019 1.0000 0.3658 
       
Post-downgrade Rating 217 BB+ BB+ D AA+ - 
∆ rating (# of downgrade 
notches) 217 3 2 1 15 2.31 
       
Deals per ultimate parent 57 3.80 2 1 19  3.56 
Days between downgrades 160 294 131 24 3,581 516 
Days-to-downgrade 214 1,291 1,187 30 3,532 669.06 
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TABLE 3 
Announcement Returns to ABS Downgrades 
Cumulative abnormal returns for 217 ABS deal-downgrades by either Moody’s or S&P, for which the deal’s ultimate parent is 
identified on CRSP and Compustat. An ultimate parent is either the deal’s originator or the deal’s acquirer, in case the 
originator went bankrupt or was acquired prior to the deal’s downgrade. A total of 57 parents account for the 217 deals. 
Multiple deal downgrades of the same parent are within at least one month apart (20 trading days). Financial institutions (FI) 
are firms with a one-digit SIC code of 6. A parent downgrade is an event that occurred within 6 months of a deal-downgrade in 
which a rating agency either downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative watch for a possible downgrade. The market 
model is used to estimate parameters using daily stock returns with a 250-day estimation period ending 11 days before the 
announcement date. Market returns are proxied by the CRSP value-weighted returns. P-values reported in parentheses.  
 
 N CAR(-1, 0)  CAR (-1, +1) 
Full sample 217 -0.81%** (0.016)  
-1.14%** 
(0.013) 
 
Announcement returns by firm type 
     FI (one digit SIC code=6) 140 -1.09%** (0.026)  
-1.74%*** 
(0.008) 
     
     Non FI 77 -0.31% (0.358)  
-0.05% 
(0.910) 
 
Announcement returns by parent downgrade 
     Downgrade (within ½ year) 59 -1.28%** (0.037)  
-1.85%* 
(0.080) 
     
    No downgrade 158 -0.63% (0.115)  
-0.88%* 
(0.076) 
 
 
  
87 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 continued  
 
Panel B: announcement returns by firm type and parent downgrade 
 CAR(-1, 0)  CAR (-1, +1) 
 FI  Non-FI  FI  Non-FI 
Downgrade (within ½ a year) 
-1.99%* 
(0.086) 
[n=24] 
-0.79% 
(0.245) 
[n=35] 
 
-4.48%** 
(0.036) 
[n=24] 
-0.05% 
(0.959) 
[n=35] 
      
No downgrade 
-0.90%* 
(0.097) 
[n=116] 
0.09% 
(0.708) 
[n=42] 
 
-1.18%* 
(0.073) 
[n=116] 
-0.05% 
(0.861) 
[n=42] 
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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TABLE 4 
Market Access before and around ABS Downgrades 
Average time (in days) between ABS issuances by a firm which experiences a deal downgrade, relative to the time 
difference between the two ABS issuances right before and after the downgrade. ABS deal-downgrades by either 
Moody’s or S&P, for which the deal’s ultimate parent is identified on CRSP and Compustat. Sample period between 
1986 and 2005. An ultimate parent is either the deal’s originator or the deal’s acquirer, in case the originator went 
bankrupt or was acquired prior to the deal’s downgrade. Multiple deal downgrades of the same parent are within at 
least one month apart (20 trading days). Panel A (B, C) includes 25 (24, 17) parents that account for 89 (70, 49) deals 
for which data on ABS activity is available on SDC. Financial institutions (FI) are firms with a one-digit SIC code of 
6. A Downgrade is an event that occurred within 6 months of a deal-downgrade in which a rating agency either 
downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative watch for a possible downgrade. P-values reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
 
Sponsors with downgraded deals 
  
Sponsors without downgraded deals 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
Pre 
downgrade 
ABS 
issuance 
frequency 
 
(1) 
Days 
between 
issues 
around 
downgrade 
(2) 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 Pre 
downgrade 
ABS 
issuance 
frequency 
 
(4) 
Days 
between 
issues 
around 
downgrade 
(5) 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
 Industry 
Adj. 
Difference 
 
 
(3) – (6) 
 
Panel A: all deal-downgrades with prior ABS issuances by ultimate parent 
Full 
sample 89 55 258 
202** 
(0.039) 
 48 61 13* (0.053) 
 192** 
(0.033) 
     FI  63 51 268 217* (0.087) 
 42 57 15* (0.088) 
 205* 
(0.088) 
     Non FI 26 65 232 167 (0.141) 
 62 70 8 (0.366) 
 158 
(0.135) 
Downgrade 21 62 296 234* (0.073) 
 69 83 14 (0.122) 
 220* 
(0.073) 
No 
downgrade 68 53 246 
193 
(0.104) 
 41 54 13 (0.130) 
 183 
(0.104) 
 
Panel B: deal-downgrades with at least 3 prior ABS issuances by ultimate parent 
Full 
sample 70 46 172 
125** 
(0.026) 
 52 59 7 (0.115) 
 120** 
(0.025) 
     FI  50 38 131 92* (0.088) 
 44 51 7 (0.129) 
 87* 
(0.093) 
     Non FI 20 65 275 209 (0.157) 
 72 80 7 (0.523) 
 201 
(0.145) 
Downgrade 20 64 208 143 (0.124) 
 65 75 9 (0.235) 
 134 
(0.119) 
No 
downgrade 50 39 157 
118* 
(0.093) 
 47 53 6 (0.285) 
 115* 
(0.091) 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Panel C: deal-downgrades with prior ABS issuances of similar asset type by ultimate parent 
Full 
sample 49 49 337 
288*** 
(0.005) 
 
- - - 
  
     FI  34 47 274 227** (0.027) 
 
- - - 
  
     Non FI 15 53 480 427* (0.093) 
 
- - - 
  
Downgrade 13 39 296 256 (0.168) 
 
- - - 
  
No 
downgrade 36 52 352 
300** 
(0.018) 
 
- - - 
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TABLE 4B 
Punishment Period: Demand or Supply Driven? 
The table reports the quarterly growth rate in securitizable assets during the punishment 
period (documented in Table 4). The sample includes the 89 downgraded deals for which 
data on ABS activity of the parent is available on SDC. Downgrade is an event that 
occurred within 6 months of a deal-downgrade in which a rating agency either 
downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative watch for a possible downgrade. For FIs 
that are classified as depository institutions (N=37), securitizable assets represent the sum 
of real-estate, agriculture, and consumer loans. Loan-level data is from Call Reports. For 
non-depository institutions, securitizable assets represent accounts receivables. Data for 
non-depository institutions is from Compustat. P-values reported in parentheses. Median 
significance based on Wilcoxon sign rank test statistics. ***, **, * represents significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 N Mean Median 
Full sample  89 0.1011*** (0.000) 
0.0343*** 
(<0.000) 
    
FIs (one digit SIC 
code=6) 63 
0.0948*** 
(0.000) 
0.0600*** 
(<0.000) 
Non-FIs 26 0.1166 (0.151) 
0.0157 
(0.277) 
    
Downgrade (within ½ a 
year) 23 
0.2105* 
(0.053) 
0.0214* 
(0.066) 
No downgrade 66 0.0630*** (<0.000) 
0.0394*** 
(<0.000) 
    
Depository Inst 
(SIC=60) 37 
0.0479*** 
(0.004) 
0.0343*** 
(<0.000) 
Non-Depository Inst. 52 0.1391*** (0.005) 
0.0351*** 
(0.000) 
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TABLE 5  
Determinants of Market Reaction and Post Downgrade Securitization Activity  
Analysis of market reaction to 217 ABS deal-downgrades sponsored by 57 parents, and the 
respective securitization activity for 25 parents sponsoring 89 deals for which market access data 
is available on SDC. Delay in market access is the time difference, in days, between the two ABS 
issuances right before and after an ABS-deal downgrade (see TABLE4). Financial institution (FI) 
is a dummy variable equal 1for ABS deals sponsored by a firm with one-digit SIC code of 6. A 
parent downgrade is a dummy equal 1 if the deal’s sponsor was downgraded within 6 months of 
the deal-downgrade, in which a rating agency either downgrades the parent, or puts it on a 
negative watch for a possible downgrade. Risk is firm systematic risk defined as the difference 
between firm’s total and specific risk. Total risk is the standard deviation of daily stock return one 
year prior to ABS downgrade (excluding the 10 days prior to the event) and specific risk is the 
standard deviation of the residual from the market model regression. Size is the natural log of 
market value of equity. BBB rating is a dummy=1 if the new deal’s rating is BBB or lower. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. P-values reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
CAR (-1, 0) 
 
Ln. Delay Market Access 
Financial institution 
(dummy=1) 
0.007 
(0.208) 
-1.842*** 
(0.006) 
Parent downgrade (dummy=1) 0.001 
(0.856) 
-1.225* 
(0.061) 
(FI)*(Parent downgrade) -0.012 
(0.418) 
2.823*** 
(0.005) 
Risk 0.621 
(0.480) 
61.625 
(0.343) 
(FI)*(risk) -2.196** 
(0.041) 
-29.924 
(0.697) 
Size 0.004* 
(0.087) 
-0.252*** 
(0.000) 
BBB rating (dummy=1) -0.006 
(0.270) 
0.260 
(0.460) 
Tranche-to-deal -0.001 
(0.896) 
0.716 
(0.172) 
Constant -0.041 
(0.128) 
7.039*** 
(0.000) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.0306 0.2439 
F-statistics 1.77* 6.29*** 
N 217 89 
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TABLE 6 
Long Term Pre ABS-Downgrade Stock Performance  
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for 217 ABS deal-downgrades by either 
Moody’s or S&P, for which the deal’s ultimate parent is identified on CRSP and 
Compustat. An ultimate parent is either the deal’s originator or the deal’s acquirer, in 
case the originator went bankrupt or was acquired prior to the deal’s downgrade. 
Abnormal returns based on control firms that are matched on Industry (4 digit SIC), size 
and book-to-market equity. A total of 57 parents account for the 217 deals. Multiple deal 
downgrades of the same parent are within at least one month apart. Financial institutions 
(FI) are firms with a one-digit SIC code of 6. A parent downgrade is an event that 
occurred within 6 months of a deal-downgrade in which a rating agency either 
downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative watch for a possible downgrade. P-values 
reported in parentheses. Median significance based on Wilcoxon sign rank test statistics. 
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 1 year pre event BHAR 3 year pre event BHAR 
 N Mean Median Mean Median 
Full sample 217 -9.22%** (0.041) 
-4.80%** 
(0.036) 
-19.35%** 
(0.039) 
-12.99%** 
(0.010) 
      
    FI (one digit SIC 
code=6) 140 
-1.82 
(0.766) 
1.84 
(0.919) 
-4.53 
(0.736) 
-7.54 
(0.834) 
      
    Non FI 77 -22.67*** (<0.000) 
-16.83*** 
(<0.000) 
-46.29*** 
(<0.000) 
-29.80*** 
(<0.000) 
      
    Downgrade 
(within ½ year) 59 
-21.49*** 
(0.002) 
-18.42*** 
(0.002) 
-57.83*** 
(<0.000) 
-32.08*** 
(<0.000) 
      
     No downgrade 158 -4.64 (0.408) 
-0.17 
(0.581) 
-4.98 
(0.669) 
-2.69 
(0.449) 
 
Panel B: mean {median} pre ABS deal downgrade buy-and-hold abnormal returns by 
firm type and parent downgrade 
 1 year pre event BHAR  3 year pre event BHAR 
 FI  Non-FI  FI  Non-FI 
Downgrade (within ½ a 
year) 
-26.29%* 
{-
25.75%}* 
 [n=24] 
-18.20%*** 
{-
18.43%}** 
 [n=35] 
 
-70.42%*** 
{-
34.29%}*** 
[n=24] 
-49.20%*** 
{-
25.82%}*** 
[n=35] 
      
No downgrade 
3.23% 
{7.46%} 
[n=116] 
-26.40%*** 
{-
11.17%}*** 
[n=42] 
 
9.09% 
{19.69} 
[n=116] 
-43.87%*** 
{-
36.09%}*** 
[n=42] 
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TABLE 7 
Quarterly Operating Performance and Capital Ratio 
Median peer adjusted measures (sample firm minus matched peer) for 171 ABS deal-downgrades by either Moody’s or S&P, for which the deal’s 
ultimate parent is identified on CRSP and Compustat. An ultimate parent is either the deal’s originator or the deal’s acquirer, in case the originator 
went bankrupt or was acquired prior to the deal’s downgrade. Adjusted measures based on control firms that are matched on Industry (4 digit SIC), 
size and book-to-market equity. A total of 54 parents account for the 171 deals. Multiple deal downgrades of the same parent are within at least 
one quarter apart. Financial institutions (FI) are firms with a one-digit SIC code of 6. A parent downgrade is an event that occurred within 6 
months of a deal-downgrade in which a rating agency either downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative watch for a possible downgrade. 
Significance based on Wilcoxon sign rank test statistics. ***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: raw and adjusted measures, full sample (n=171) 
 ROA ROE Equity/assets  Adj. ROA Adj. ROE Adj. 
Equity/assets 
 
-4 0.0033 0.0383 0.1028  -0.0008** 0.0034 -0.0300*** 
-3 0.0033 0.0382 0.0992  -0.0009*** 0.0021 -0.0332*** 
-2 0.0032 0.0347 0.0924  -0.0010*** -0.0007 -0.0333*** 
-1 0.0033 0.0365 0.0888  -0.0010*** 0.0014 -0.0366*** 
        
+1 0.0031 0.0374 0.0892  -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0370*** 
        
∆ (-1 to +1) 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0005**  -0.0002* -0.0040** -0.0025** 
∆ (-4 to +1) -0.0003*** -0.0029*** -0.0007  -0.0003*** -0.0030*** -0.0007 
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Table 7 continued 
 
Panel B: adjusted measures, firm type 
 Adj. ROA Adj. ROE Adj. Equity/assets  Adj. ROA Adj. ROE Adj. 
Equity/assets 
 FI (n=114)  Non FI (n=57) 
-4 -0.0002 0.0032 -0.0056**  -0.0060** 0.0045 -0.2707*** 
-3 -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0072**  -0.0069*** 0.0032 -0.2588*** 
-2 -0.0007** -0.0021 -0.0047**  -0.0048 0.0087 -0.2588*** 
-1 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0030**  -0.0054* 0.0087 -0.2583*** 
        
+1 -0.0009*** -0.0010 -0.0035**  -0.0095*** 0.0007 -0.2620*** 
        
∆ (-1 to +1) -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0012  -0.0031 -0.0151* -0.0093*** 
∆ (-4 to +1) -0.0002* -0.0006 -0.0001  -0.0014*** -0.0103*** -0.0092** 
 
Panel C: adjusted measures, parent downgrade 
 Parent downgrade (n=54)  No parent downgrade (n=117) 
-4 -0.0030** -0.0064 -0.0440***  -0.0004 0.0054*** -0.0207*** 
-3 -0.0040** -0.0087 -0.0573***  -0.0007* 0.0032 -0.0225*** 
-2 -0.0042** -0.0052 -0.0583***  -0.0009** 0.0002 -0.0231*** 
-1 -0.0034*** -0.0116** -0.0606***  -0.0006 0.0059** -0.0252*** 
        
+1 -0.0097*** -0.0295*** -0.0842***  -0.0011** 0.0033 -0.0263*** 
        
∆ (-1 to +1) -0.0015* -0.0132* -0.0073***  -0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0012 
∆ (-4 to +1) -0.0037*** -0.0295*** -0.0030*  -0.0000 0.0006 -0.0005 
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Table 7 continued 
 
Panel D: adjusted measures, by firm type and parent downgrade 
 
 Adj. ROA Adj. ROE Adj. Equity/assets  Adj. ROA Adj. ROE Adj. 
Equity/assets` 
 
 FI, Parent downgrade (n=22)  Non-FI, Parent downgrade (n=32) 
-4 -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0128  -0.0056* -0.0150 -0.1390*** 
-3 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0134  -0.0079** -0.0270 -0.1555*** 
-2 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0153  -0.0055* -0.0182 -0.1555*** 
-1 -0.0008* -0.0050 -0.0165  -0.0072** -0.0291 -0.1783*** 
        
+1 -0.0017*** -0.0163*** -0.0068  -0.0110*** -0.0486 -0.1837*** 
        
∆ (-1 to +1) -0.0007** -0.0108** 0.0013  -0.0034 -0.0145 -0.0127*** 
∆ (-4 to +1) -0.0008** -0.0125*** 0.0017  -0.0051*** -0.0385** -0.0183*** 
 
 FI, No Parent downgrade (n=92)  Non-FI, No parent downgrade (n=25) 
-4 0.0000 0.0041* -0.0042**  -0.0063 0.0115*** -0.2976*** 
-3 -0.0004 0.0027 -0.0055**  -0.0060 0.0105** -0.3096*** 
-2 -0.0008** -0.0021 -0.0026**  -0.0039 0.0218*** -0.3060*** 
-1 -0.0004 0.0031 -0.0020**  -0.0037 0.0173*** -0.2805*** 
        
+1 -0.0007 0.0020 -0.0034***  -0.0073* 0.0064* -0.2904*** 
        
∆ (-1 to +1) 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0012  -0.0031 -0.0151** -0.0065 
∆ (-4 to +1) -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0005  -0.0000 -0.0040* -0.0000 
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TABLE 8 
Average Daily Abnormal Returns  
We estimate the Fama-French model of daily portfolio returns  
 
tttrfmtrfpt hHMLsSMBRRRR εβα +++−+=− )()(  
 
where ptR  is the return on the portfolio of sample firms in day t, rfR is the date t risk-free 
rate, mtR is the date t return on the value-weighted market index, tSMB  is the date t return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of small-cap stock minus the date t return on a value-
weighted portfolio of large-cap stocks, tHML  is the date t return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the date t return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. We construct portfolios of all sponsors that 
experienced ABS downgrades, and follow their performance for a period of one- and 
three-years prior to the downgrade. Each sponsor’s stock remains in the portfolio until 
one day before the downgrade date. Financial institutions (FIs) are firms with a one-digit 
SIC code of 6. A parent downgrade is an event that occurred within 6 months of a deal-
downgrade in which a rating agency either downgrades the parent, or puts it on a negative 
watch for a possible downgrade. ***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 1 Year Before  
ABS Downgrade 
3 Years Before  
ABS Downgrade 
    Full sample -0.009%*** (p=0.001) 
-0.022%*** 
(p=0.001) 
   
    FIs (one digit SIC 
code=6) 
-0.005** 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.146) 
    Non-FIs -0.006*** (0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(<0.000) 
   
    Downgrade (within ½ 
year) 
-0.011*** 
(<0.000) 
-0.016*** 
(<0.000) 
    No downgrade -0.002 (0.418) 
-0.006 
(0.287) 
        
    Non-FIs, Non-
Downgrade 
-0.003 
(0.148) 
-0.011*** 
(0.000) 
    Non-FIs, Downgrade -0.005*** (0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(<0.000) 
   
    FIs, Non-Downgrade 0.000 (0.831) 
0.000 
(0.989) 
    FIs, Downgrade -0.007*** (0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
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Appendix I: Sample Construction 
 
No. of tranches 
 
Steps 
 
8,300 
 
Initial sample of downgraded tranches between 1986-2005  
by both Moody’s and S&P 
 
  Eliminate tranches related to Tobacco Settlements or those sponsored by 
State/Federal agencies 
 Eliminate tranches related to Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
5,138  
  Eliminate tranches without an identified ultimate parent (such as Conduits) 
 Eliminate tranches for which the identified parent has no CRSP and 
Compustat data from at least (t-1) relative to downgrade 
1,604  
  Eliminate double-counting: downgraded tranches of the same parent by both 
rating agencies that occur on the same day (i.e. retain the earliest downgrade 
on that day) 
 Eliminate downgrades of different tranches from the same deal that occur on 
the same day (retain the largest downgraded tranche) 
 
392 
 
From this point, each tranche represents a deal 
 
  Eliminate downgraded deals related to the same parent that occur within less 
than 1 month apart 
 
236 
 
  Eliminate downgraded deals with an unverified date or with a confounding 
event 
 
217 deals by 57 parents 
 
Final sample 
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CHAPTER IV: ESSAY III 
Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Initial Securitizations by Bank 
Holding Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
 The recent financial crisis exposes regulators’ limited ability to monitor financial 
institutions. In addition, it highlights the importance of establishing alternative 
mechanisms that limit financial institutions’ tendency to engage in excessive risk taking. 
Curbing such tendencies relies heavily on a supervisory system that is based on sound 
regulatory practices, which are complemented with effective corporate governance. This 
paper focuses on the latter point, namely the importance of governance, at the 
institutional level, in limiting moral hazard and contributing to the overall stability of the 
financial sector. The paper addresses the role of internal corporate control mechanisms in 
mitigating the negative effects of securitization. 
 Securitization, the process in which non-tradable assets (such as loans) are 
transformed into liquid securities (i.e. asset-backed securities, or ABS) via cash-flow 
repackaging, is considered the culprit of the recent financial crisis (Gorton, 2008). With 
almost $1.3 trillion in newly issued ABS securities in 2006 alone (Gorton, 2009), there 
were hardly any financial institutions that were not involved with these fixed-income 
instruments in one form or another. Once these assets experienced massive downgrades 
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in mid 2007, the financial system was on the verge of the most severe financial crisis 
since the great depression.   
 The theoretical rational suggests that securitization should benefit securitizers, as 
it provides an important liquidity source, reduces funding costs, allows valuable capital to 
be directed into more productive investments, and enables financial institutions to focus 
on activities in which they have a comparative advantage (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; 
Gorton and Souleles 2007; Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007). However, recent empirical 
evidence indicates that securitization affects its sponsors negatively. More specifically, 
securitization is associated with shareholders’ wealth destruction, long term 
underperformance, and increase in risk and leverage (Franke and Krahnen, 2005; 
Instefjord, 2005; Krahnen and Wilde, 2006; Hansel and Krahnen, 2007; Higgins, Mason, 
and Mordel, 2008).  
 As opposed to the recently growing empirical literature on securitization, the 
governance literature is well established with respect to the impact of internal corporate 
control mechanisms on firm value and risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the 
structures of variables such as board, ownership, and compensation directly influence 
firm conduct and performance. Hence a natural question arising from the recent financial 
crisis is whether securitizers differ from non-securitizers with respect to their governance 
mechanisms.  
 To address this question, I study the governance mechanisms of the largest most 
frequent securitizers, bank holding companies (BHCs), just prior to their first ever 
securitization transaction. Based on discussions with industry practitioners, I assume that 
if governance plays a role in a BHC’s decision to securitize, then it is most likely to be 
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observable when the BHC initiates its securitization program. Once securitization is 
introduced, the BHC would typically issue an ABS deal once every few months, making 
securitization part of its ongoing operation and as a result limiting the involvement of 
governance with successive deals.  
 I compare the governance characteristics of 44 BHCs prior to their first ever 
securitization transactions with those of a matching sample based on industry, size, and 
leverage. I show that securitizers have lower levels of insider stock ownership and that in 
general, BHCs with higher levels of insider ownership are less likely to securitize.  
Next, I find that internal corporate control variables mitigate some of the negative 
effects caused by securitization. I show that post-securitization systematic risk tends to be 
higher for securitizers, yet it is lower for securitizers with higher levels of CEO equity 
based compensation. In addition, implied leverage obtained from the Hamada equation 
(being directly related to the amount securitized) is lower for BHC with higher levels of 
insider ownership. Finally, post-event firm value (measured by Tobin’s q) is positively 
related to the proportion of outside directors serving on the boards of securitizers.  
These empirical results indicate that securitizers are systematically different from 
non-securitizers and that in fact, internal corporate control mechanisms affect post-
securitization risk, leverage, and firm value. Yet it is important to emphasis a major 
limitation of the documented results. By mid 2007, when the first indicators of the 
oncoming financial crisis became evident, most BHCs were already securitizing for some 
time. Thus at the eve of the crisis, the typical frequent securitizers are not necessarily 
similar to my sample of first-time securitizers.38  
                                                 
38
 Utilizing a sample that includes multiple securitization deals by each company would address this 
concern, yet it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the caveat of such a time-series analysis is the 
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Nevertheless, the cross-sectional results are still valid if we consider changes that 
took place recently. First, securitization activity (i.e. new deal issuance) between 2007 
and 2009 came almost to a halt. Second, in June 2009 the Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB) introduced significant changes to the accounting rules that govern 
securitization, potentially limiting the ability of BHCs to issue future ABS deals (Fitch 
Ratings, 2009). The drying-up of the securitization market along with future limitations 
on ABS issuances serve as a “breading ground” for creative financial solutions. If BHCs 
consider securitization as a major funding source, then they are likely to adapt to the new 
regulatory and accounting rules by creating funding modes that will maintain the benefits 
of off-balance sheet financing, while at the same time meet (or even by-pass) the new 
rules that are put in place to curb excessive risk taking. Since regulators have to be on the 
alert and react quickly to potential problems, having proper governance mechanisms in 
place will complement regulators’ efforts in monitoring moral hazard and containing 
systemic risk.  
The reminder of the paper first describes the various internal corporate 
governance mechanisms that serve as the basis for my analysis. Next, I introduce the data 
and methodology used in this study. Univariate and cross-sectional regression results are 
provided in the following section. In the final part I discuss the results and conclude.  
    
2. Literature Review – Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
possibility of insignificant results. For instance, BHCs typically securitize dozens of deals in any given 
year. As such, the board of directors is less likely to be involved with deals’ approval beyond the first one. 
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 Numerous studies have established that internal corporate governance 
mechanisms affect firm value, performance, and risk. Some of the common variables 
include board size and composition, CEO age and tenure, director and managerial share 
ownership, CEO equity based compensation, and institutional/blockholder’s ownership. I 
discuss each of the above in turn. 
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) document that board size is inversely related 
to firm value, and that CEOs tend to have better control over larger boards which limits 
their monitoring effectiveness. Board composition, just as size, serves as an important 
indicator of the board’s monitoring effectiveness. Dunn (1987) concludes that outsider-
dominated boards are effective monitors, while Fristenberg and Malkiel (1980) stress that 
it is the outsiders’ independence and expertise which contribute to their superior 
monitoring capabilities. Outsider-oriented boards are also more likely to replace 
entrenched CEOs following firm’s poor performance (Weisbach, 1988, Bryd and 
Hickman, 1992, Bhagat et al. 1994). Overall, firm value appears to be positively related 
to the number of outside directors.  
CEO age and tenure are also assumed to be directly related to firm value. 
Increased CEO experience is associated with improved firm performance as the CEO’s 
knowledge and understanding of the firm and its industry improve (Bacon and Brown, 
1973, Alderfer, 1986, Brown and Maloney, 1999).  
Finally, the literature documents extensively the governing role of institutional 
investors. These investors, who have the ability to monitor and the incentive to discipline, 
affect managerial behavior by forcing managers to focus on firm-performance 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Nesbitt 1994, Smith 1996, Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
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More recently, Cornett et al. (2007) refine this finding and conclude that improvements in 
operating performance are observed when institutional investors do not have business 
relations with the firms they monitor.  
 
3.  Data 
 
 My initial sample includes all the available securitization transactions reported by 
the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database from 1985-2005. The SDC data base 
includes deal specific data such as the identity of the issuer/entity, ultimate parent, 
amount securitized, underlying asset, type of security issued, underwriter/book runner, 
deal ratings and issuance date. I omit issues associated with ADRs, REITs, and closed-
end funds. I also omit issues classified as CDO’s since the identity of their ultimate 
parent is unknown.   
My ultimate goal is to identify the first securitization transaction made by each 
unique issuing Bank Holding Company (BHC) in the SDC database. By identifying the 
first securitization transaction, I am able to study the “clean” effect governance has on 
BHC that start securitizing since subsequent securitizations are likely to be continuations 
of the issuing firms’ initial funding strategies. Furthermore, the board of directors is less 
likely to be involved once securitization becomes part of the ongoing financing operation 
of the BHC, and as such follow-on deals are less likely to be informative as the first one.  
Each transaction in the SDC database is primarily identified by its issuer. The 
issuer, however, is in most cases not the ultimate parent company but a bankruptcy-
remote intermediate trust subsidiary created by the ultimate parent company. SDC 
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provides information on the ultimate parent of each issuer but this information is not 
always complete. In some instances, the information is just missing. In other cases, the 
information refers to a publicly-traded parent subsidiary which must be tracked down and 
linked with the publicly-traded parent.  
Once I have identified the first securitization transaction made by each unique 
ultimate parent company I then check the issuing firm’s data availability on CRSP. Many 
of the sponsor firms in the SDC database are firms that do not trade publicly. SDC 
provides data fields for stock exchange of the ultimate parent, the ticker symbol of the 
ultimate parent, and the CUSIP of the ultimate parent. Observations that have valid 
entries for stock exchange and ticker are included in the data. Observations that only have 
CUSIP available are screened through the CRSP database to see if they have at some 
point in time been publicly traded. Those that are found on CRSP are included in the 
data.  
Financial variables for the publicly-traded BHCs come from year-end call reports. 
The financial data includes total assets, capital ratio, equity growth rate, liquidity ratio, 
and non-performing loan ratio (see Appendix I for variable construction detail). I collect 
governance data from proxy statements published one year prior to the banks’ 
securitization initiation activity. The governance variables control for board size and 
independence, CEO characteristics and compensation, director and block-holder stock 
ownership.   
To ensure that I have identified the first securitization and to identify the actual 
announcement of the first securitization, all events in the final data set are double-
checked on Factiva. I search for the earliest news story relating to securitization around 
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the SDC issuance date for each issuing company. The date of the earliest news story is 
used as the announcement date for the securitization. I also search prior to the issue date 
for any news stories that contain words such as securitization and asset-backed to ensure 
that there were no prior securitizations that did not show up on the SDC data base. I did 
not find any observations where there was a securitization related news story prior to the 
first identified issuance on SDC. If no news stories at all are found, the SDC issuance 
date is used as the announcement date.  
The final sample of 44 observations is reported in Appendix II. To facilitate the 
analysis, a control sample of non-securitizers is matched based on industry, size, and 
capital ratio in the year prior to securitization initiation. Once a peer is matched in any 
given year, it is dropped from the potential sample of non-securitizers starting that year 
onward.  
Summary statistic results are reported in Table 1. The asset size of the average 
BHC is about $28 billion. 28% of these assets are classified as liquid, while the sample’s 
average capital ratio is 6.7%. The typical deal is large ($270 million), representing about 
2.6% of total on-balance sheet assets. Table 2 compares securitizers’ with their matched 
peers. Since securitizers tend to be large companies with relatively constrained equity 
growth rates and liquidity positions, it is not surprising that non-securitizers are smaller, 
with a stronger equity growth rate and a higher liquidity level. The governance 
characteristics of the groups are fairly similar, except for the level of stock ownership. 
Banks that securitize for the first time have significantly lower levels of managerial and 
director stock ownership.  
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4.  Risk, Leverage, and Operating Performance 
 
This section investigates the impact of securitization on the issuers’ level of risk.  
To this end, I compute β
 
as a systematic risk measure and compare it before and after 
the securitization initiation. In addition, I compare the post event β
 
between securitizers 
and their matched peers.39 Since systematic risk and leverage are related, I also compare 
the debt-to-equity ratio (book value leverage ratio) with the implicit leverage ratio for 
securitizers following the event. While securitizing firms’ accounting (on-balance sheet) 
leverage may not change (or may decline), the securitizing firm’s implicit leverage, as 
measured by total assets under management (i.e. both on- and off-balance sheet), may 
increase. In order to obtain implicit leverage, I utilize the Hamada (1969) equation such 
that  
    
( )( )T
E
D
DUUL −−+= 1ββββ       (1) 
First I use the standard market model to estimate β  prior to securitization for a 
period of one year, without including the 10-days prior to the event. This is essentially an 
estimation of the levered beta, or priorL,β . Next, I obtain the unlevered beta, or Uβ , from 
equation (4) by using the estimated priorL,β , the book value of debt-to-equity, and the 
appropriate corporate income tax bracket (T). I assume debt is risk-less. Finally, I use the 
market model to estimate the one-year post-event postL,β . I use equation (1) and the 
                                                 
39
 As a robustness test, I compute two other measures of systematic risk. According to the first one, 
systematic risk is the difference between total risk and firm specific risk. Total risk is the standard deviation 
of daily returns and firm specific risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the market model 
regression. The second measure, the likelihood of insolvency, is a function of capital ratio, expected ROA, 
and σROA. Results based on these measures are similar to the ones reported. 
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information on postL,β , Uβ  and (T) to calculate the implied D/E ratio after securitization 
and compare it to the accounting D/E ratio. An implied D/E ratio higher than the 
accounting D/E ratio indicates that the increase in systematic risk is due to implicit 
leverage rather than other factors.  
 Table 3 reports the systematic risk results. Beta increases significantly following 
securitization initiation. The median change in beta (one year after minus one year 
before) is significant at the 5% level. The adjusted median systematic risk measure 
(securitizer minus peer) in the year following the event is significant as well. Post event, 
the average implied leverage is about 36% higher relative to the actual leverage, an 
indication that the increase in systematic risk is driven by an increase in leverage. Finally, 
Table 4 introduces adjusted operating performance measures for a period of 4 years 
before and after the initiation of a securitization program, however none of the adjusted 
measures is significant. 
  
5.  Governance and Securitization – Multivariate Analysis 
 
5.1. Determinants of securitization initiation 
 
Bank holding companies that begin securitizing experience a significant increase 
in systematic risk, which is driven by an increase in leverage. This section investigates 
whether board independence, CEO compensation, insider and institutional stock 
ownership affect the decision to securitize and mitigate. In addition, I explore whether 
these variables mitigate the ex-post negative effects documented so far.  
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First, I estimate a probit model for the determinants of securitization initiation, 
where the dependent variable equals 1 for BHCs that start securitizing and zero otherwise 
(for sample of matched-peers). Table 5 presents the coefficients from the regression 
where I control for both firm and governance characteristics. Following Gorton and 
Soloules (2006), I include size squared to control for the possibility of a non-monotonic 
relation between securitization and firm size. The probability of securitization increases 
with size as the size squared coefficient (0.39) is highly significant. Liquidity, defined as 
(cash + federal fund sold + book value of securities available for sale) divided by total 
assets, is a significant determinant of the securitization probability as well. Liquidity-
constraint BHCs are more likely to securitize as the negative coefficient (-5.75) is 
significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.012).  
In the second part of Table 5, I control for various governance variables as 
potential determinants of securitization initiation. I control for board independence by 
identifying outside directors. Following the literature convention, I define outside 
directors as non-employees of the corporation, without business ties to it, and that do not 
serve as director on the board of any of the BHC’s subsidiaries. I define insiders as 
directors employed by the BHC. Finally, I control for institutional ownership by 
identifying the largest blockholder’s stock ownership as reported in the 13-F fillings. 
Overall, the only significant governance variable that affects a BHC’s decision to begin 
securitizing is insider ownership. BHCs with a more concentrated insider ownership are 
less likely to securitize as the insider stock ownership coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
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5.2. Internal corporate governance mechanisms and securitization  
 
In this section I investigate whether the documented increase in post securitization 
systemic risk is affected by the BHC’s ownership structure, managerial compensation, 
and board composition. Furthermore, I study whether the driving force underlying the 
increase in systemic risk, i.e. implied leverage, is related to these indicators. I also 
investigate the relation between these various governance mechanisms and securitizers’ 
value, measured by Tobin’s q.  
I adjust for self-selection bias in the data by including the BHC’s predicted 
securitization probability (PSP) value obtained from the regression in Table 5. This 
increases the number of observations to 88 and improves the power of the statistical 
inferences. I control for the pre-securitization level of risk by including the standard 
deviation of non-performing loans. In addition I include size (natural log of total assets) 
and on-balance sheet leverage (the ratio of equity-to-risky assets) as potential explanatory 
variables. 
The first column in Table 6 relates the post securitization beta with the various 
governance variables. Securitizers exhibit an increase in systemic risk following their 
securitization initiation (positive PSP coefficient, p-value = 0.038), yet BHCs with higher 
levels of CEO equity based compensation that are more likely to securitize (interaction 
term, PSP*CEO equity compensation) exhibit a decrease in systemic risk, though the 
coefficient is only marginally significant (p-value=0.057). Riskier and larger BHCs 
(measured by standard deviation of non-performing loans and total assets, respectively) 
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exhibit higher levels of systematic risk one-year following the BHCs’ securitization 
initiation.   
The second column introduces the relation between leverage and the various 
governance variables. I use the measure of implied leverage (obtained from the Hamada 
equation) as the dependent variable since this is the appropriate measure for a securitizer 
(as opposed to book value leverage) given the off-balance sheet financing. The 
interaction term between securitization probability and insider stock ownership 
(PSP*insider stock ownership) is negative (-9.06) and significant at the 5 percent level. 
This suggests that potential securitizers with higher levels of insider ownership are more 
cautious about managing both on-and off-balance sheet assets, as their implied leverage 
is lower post-securitization. 
Finally, the third column in Table 6 introduces the effect of internal governance 
mechanisms on firm value. I use Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value40. On the one hand, q 
is lower for potential securitizers with larger blockholders. On the other hand, it is higher 
when potential securitizers have boards that are more independent, as the coefficient 
PSP*(percent outside directors) is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
 The fact that securitization has transformed financial intermediation is 
unquestionable. Through it, originators can manage interest rate risk, increase funding 
and liquidity sources, focus on activities in which they possess a comparative advantage, 
                                                 
40
 I follow the definition by Adams and Meheran (2003) where Tobin’s q is the ratio of (book value of 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity)/ book value of assets.  
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and avoid burdensome regulation.41 Calomiris and Mason (2004) indicate that as the 
securitization market evolves, it promotes efficient contracting mechanisms that reduce 
the need for equity capital to support the deal, while mitigating adverse selection costs.  
Yet these benefits seem negligible in light of the 2007 financial crisis. Voices 
criticizing securitization point out that it increases systemic risk due to banks’ habit of 
retaining the equity portion of securitized deals, without having the adequate capital 
levels on-balance sheet to support it. Moreover, critics question the transactions’ ability 
to truly separate assets from the originator and relocate risk since under certain conditions 
banks are required to absorb the losses generated by their failed ABS deals, (Stiglitz, 
2008; Krugman, 2008).  
The documented results highlight the role of managerial incentive-alignment in 
ameliorating the negative effects securitizers face, particularly those related to systemic 
risk, implied leverage, and firm value. However, it is important to remember that the 
results pertain to a cross-sectional sample of first-time securitizers, and as such there are 
legitimate concerns regarding the applicability of the above results. Two such concerns 
relate to the scope of the sample and to the results’ validity when one considers the 
proposals for regulatory overhaul following the 2007 crisis.  
The first argument undermining the applicability of the results is that by the time 
of the 2007 financial crisis, most BHCs were already securitizing frequently, and as such 
the mitigating governance effects following the first transaction are unrelated. The second 
argument relates to the anticipated regulatory changes following the 2007 financial crisis. 
It is likely that bank supervisors will pay closer attention to securitization, being the 
                                                 
41
 On the mechanisms and benefits of securitization, see Gorton and Souleles (2006), and Greenbaum and 
Thakor (2007).  
  
112 
preferred funding mechanism of most BHC and the impetus of the 2007 meltdown, as 
evident by recent proposal for regulatory changes that would limit the ability to move 
assets off-balance sheet (Fitch special report, 2009). Hence not only that the relation 
between governance structure and the post securitization initiation risk, leverage, and 
firm value is limited in scope (being only observed for first time securitizers when in fact 
by the time of the crisis most BHCs are already frequent securitizers), the results may 
also be irrelevant as the ability to securitize might change under a stricter regulatory 
regime.  
Yet history has shown that financial institutions adapt to regulatory changes and 
operate in ways that maximize their incentives. Furthermore, if securitization is a 
preferable funding mechanism, then financial institutions will engineer new transactions 
in such a way that will enable them to meet regulatory requirements, while at the same 
time enjoy the benefits of off-balance sheet financing (Scism and Smith, 2009; Anderson, 
2009). With that respect, having effective governance mechanisms that curb risk-taking is 
as valuable today (in the newly regulated financial environment) as it was at the time 
when securitization was first introduced. 
The recent crisis also highlights the shortcomings of prudential regulation, 
especially relating to supervisors inability to accurately measure bank risk and regulators 
adherence to the too-big-to-fail doctrine which undermines any effective market 
discipline (Calomiris, 2009). Relying on internal corporate control mechanisms such as 
managers’ equity based compensation, insider stock ownership, and board independence 
can promote stability in the financial system by curbing excessive risk taking and 
boosting firm value.   
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The results also highlight the limited influence institutional investors have over 
BHCs. Potential securitizers face no discipline from their largest blockholders as their 
effect on the securitizers’ systematic risk and leverage is negligible. At the same time, 
blockholders have a surprisingly negative effect when considering BHCs’ value 
following securitization initiation. Regulatory limitations on the ownership concentration 
in financial institutions (the Bank Holding Company Act) hinders bank disciplining from 
those investors who would benefit most from monitoring managerial decision making. 
Furthermore, these limitations buffer mismanaged BHCs from the market of corporate 
control, thereby perpetuating moral hazard. Adjusting these ownership limitations and 
introducing the threat of hostile takeovers would establish effective monitoring from 
informed investors and would curb excessive risk taking.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
 The recent financial crisis highlights the difficulties regulators face while trying to 
monitor financial institutions. Such difficulties can be attenuated by encouraging 
alternative mechanisms that limit the institutions’ tendency to engage in excessive risk 
taking. Previous literature has shown that corporate governance limits moral hazard and 
contributes to the overall stability of the financial sector, stability that was seriously 
hindered during the recent crisis due to the financial sector’s reliance on off-balance sheet 
financing (i.e. securitization).  
 The theoretical rational suggests that securitization should benefit securitizers. 
Yet recent empirical evidence indicates that securitization is associated with 
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shareholders’ wealth destruction, long term underperformance, and increase in risk and 
leverage. Since the corporate governance literature suggests that variables such as board 
composition, ownership concentration, and compensation structures directly influence 
firm conduct and performance, a natural question arising from the recent financial crisis 
is whether securitizers differ from non-securitizers with respect to their governance 
mechanisms.  
 To address this question, I hand-collect governance data on the largest most 
frequent securitizers, bank holding companies (BHCs), just prior to their first ever 
securitization transaction. I assume that if governance is related to the securitization 
decision, then it is most observable when the BHC initiates its securitization program. 
The reason is that once securitization is introduced, most BHCs would typically issue 
ABS deals on an ongoing basis, making securitization part of their operation and as a 
result governance involvement (for instance, getting board approval) with successive 
deals would be limited.  
 I compare the governance characteristics of 44 BHCs prior to their first ever 
securitization transactions with those of a matched sample based on industry, size, and 
leverage. I show that securitizers have lower levels of insider stock ownership and that in 
general, BHCs with higher levels of insider ownership are less likely to securitize. In 
addition, I find some evidence that internal corporate control variables mitigate some of 
the negative effects caused by securitization. I show that post securitization systematic 
risk tends to be higher for securitizers, yet lower for securitizers with higher levels of 
CEO equity based compensation. Furthermore, implied leverage (as obtained from the 
Hamada equation) is lower for BHCs with higher levels of insider ownership. Finally, 
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post event firm value (Tobin’s q) is positively related to the proportion of outside 
directors serving on the boards of securitizers.  
 Understanding the role of governance with respect to financial institutions’ 
tendency to engage in risk shifting activities would contribute greatly to the monitoring 
abilities of regulators. This study provides initial evidence on the importance of 
governance as a complementary mechanism to the supervisory system. Future research 
should focus on the long term relation between the two and extend the results beyond the 
cross-sectional analysis.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for 44 bank holding companies (BHC) that were engaged in securitization activity 
between 1985 and 2005. Securitization data are obtained from SDC. Firm level data are obtained from year-
end Call Reports, and are aggregated for all banks within the same BHC. All variables are as of year-end 
prior to the initiation of securitization (i.e. t-1). Growth in equity is the percentage change from t-2 to t-1. 
Liquidity ratio is (Cash + Fed Funds Sold + BV. securities) / assets. Capital ratio is book value of equity to 
total assets. Risky assets are total assets adjusted for cash, federal funds sold, and securities. Non-
performing loans ratio defined as loans 90 days past due but still accruing interest plus non-accrual loans to 
total loans.  
 
 Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. 
 
Bank  characteristics 
 
     
Total assets (in millions of 1997 $) 28,166 18,056 631.424 187,297 33,565 
Capital ratio 0.0669 0.0616 0.0447 0.1182 0.0173 
Capital to risky assets 0.0854 0.0831 0.0541 0.1838 0.0209 
Growth equity 0.1380 0.0981 -0.1637 1.0457 0.2109 
Liquidity ratio 0.2806 0.2836 0.1713 0.4446 0.0671 
Non performing loans ratio 0.0207 0.0174 0.0043 0.0637 0.0146 
 
Deal characteristics 
      
Securitization proceeds (in millions of 1997 $) 269.478 214.278 2.229 966.327 212.430 
Proceeds-to-assets
 
0.0267 0.0153 0.0001 0.2106 0.0374 
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TABLE 2 
Median Firm and Governance Characteristics for BHCs Prior to their First Securitization 
Transaction  
Sample includes 44 bank holding companies (BHC) that were engaged in securitization activity 
between 1985 and 2005. Securitization data for the first transaction are obtained from SDC. Non-
securitizers are matched on industry, total assets, and capital ratio from year t-1. Firm level data 
are obtained from year-end Call Reports, and are aggregated for all banks within the same BHC. 
All variables are as of year-end prior to the initiation of securitization (i.e. t-1). Capital ratio is 
book value of equity to total assets. Growth in equity is the percentage change from t-2 to t-1. 
Liquidity ratio is (Cash + Fed Funds Sold + BV. securities) / assets. Non-performing loans ratio 
defined as loans 90 days past due but still accruing interest plus non-accrual loans to total loans. 
Governance data obtained from proxy statements one year prior to securitization initiation. 
Outside directors are not employees of the company, have no business ties to it, and do not sit on 
the board of a subsidiary. Insiders are board members employed by the BHC. Equity based 
compensation is the ratio between the value of granted options to salary, bonus and option value. 
Blockholder’s ownership is for the largest equity holder obtained from 13-F filings. ***, **, * 
indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Non 
Securitizers 
Securitizers Two sided  
Z stats p-value 
 
Financial variables 
 
   
Total assets (in millions) $11,304.9393 $18,056.176 0.0161 
Capital ratio 0.0667 0.0615 0.4755 
Growth equity (%∆ from t-2 to 
t-1) 
0.1431 0.0980 0.0734 
Liquidity ratio 0.3089 0.2835 0.0310 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0151 0.0169 0.2911 
 
Governance variables  
 
   
Board size 16.5 17 0.4103 
% Insiders 17.16 15.69 0.2180 
% Gray 22.42 21.82 0.8477 
% Outsiders 61.25 58.85 0.9499 
    
CEO tenure (years) 5 6 0.7473 
CEO age 55 55 0.7794 
    
Director & Exec. stock 
ownership 
3.81% 2.09% 0.0708* 
Director stock ownership 2.42% 1.26% 0.0224** 
Insider stock ownership 1.13% 0.54% 0.0210** 
CEO stock ownership 0.48% 0.31% 0.0833* 
    
CEO equity based compensation 
(option value / total comp) 0.4977 0.4628 0.5636 
    
Largest block holder  0.0389 0.0364 0.6788 
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TABLE  3 
Comparison of Median Measures of Systematic Risk (β) and Leverage 
 
The sample includes 44 BHCs. Part A reports the pre- and post-securitization median 
systematic risk measure defined as β. Beta is obtained for a period of one year before and 
after the first act of securitization, not including the 10 days surrounding the event. 
Adjusted ∆ is the defined as the post-event difference between a securitizer and its 
matched non-securitizer. Non-securitizers are based on a matched sample of industry, 
total assets, and capital ratio from year (t-1).  
 
Part B reports the median of the difference between the post transaction’s implied D/E 
ratio and the actual D/E ratio. The implied D/E is obtained from the Hamada equation. 
The Actual D/E ratio is from year end t=0 (i.e. the securitization year).  
 
Tests statistics for differences are based on t the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians. 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
Part A: Pre- and post-securitization comparison of systematic risk 
 Pre Post ∆ Adjusted ∆ 
 
β 0.87 1.05 0.11** 0.09** 
 
Part B: Post securitization (i.e. year end t=0) comparison of implied vs. actual leverage 
 
Implied Debt/Equity Actual Debt/Equity Difference 
 
   
Leverage 16.26 14.03 1.62** 
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TABLE 4 
Median Peer-Adjusted Measures For BHCs that Securitized for the First Time  
 
The table reports the median of peer-adjusted variables (sample firm minus peer firm 
values). Bank peers are chosen based on industry, asset size, and capital ratio. Year -1 
values are from the fiscal year-end prior to the transaction, while year 0 represents year-end 
values of the transaction year. Indications of significance of medians are based on 
Wilcoxon singed-rank tests. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively 
 
Yr  N  ROA  ROE  Profit margin   Net Int. Inc. / 
assets 
           
-3  39  -0.0001  0.0020  0.0016  -0.0002 
-2  41  -0.0009  0.0014  -0.0061  -0.0004 
-1  44  0.0000  0.0009  -0.0060  0.0005 
0  44  0.0001  0.0006  -0.0115  0.0010 
+1  44  0.0004  0.0003  0.0045  0.0003 
+2  40  0.0013  0.0270  0.0137  -0.0006 
+3  33  0.0005  0.0105  0.0044  0.0001 
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TABLE 5 
Probit estimation of securitization initiation 
Sample includes 44 securitizers from 1985 to 2005. Matched non-securitizers (based on 
industry, size, and capital ratio) for which governance data is available are from year t-1 
relative to securitization. Firm level data are aggregated for all banks within the same 
bank holding company (BHC), and are based on t-1 year-end Call Reports. Fee-income 
growth rate is the percent change from year t-2 to t-1. Liquidity ratio is (cash + federal 
funds sold + BV of securities) / assets. Non-performing loans ratio defined as loans 90 
days or more past due but still accruing interest plus non-accrual loans to total loans. 
Governance data collected from proxy statements in the year prior to securitization 
initiation. Outside directors are not employees of the company, have no business ties to it, 
and do not sit on the board of a subsidiary. Insiders are board members employed by the 
BHC. Equity based compensation is the ratio between the value of granted options to 
salary, bonus and option value. Blockholder’s ownership is for the largest equity holder 
obtained from 13-F filings. p-values for z-statistics reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
Ln. Assets -12.78*** 
 (0.001) 
[Ln. (Assets)]2 0.39*** 
 (0.001) 
σ non-performing loans -1.82 
 (0.927) 
Liquidity ratio -5.75** 
 (0.012) 
 
Governance variables 
 
% outside directors 0.76 
 (0.160) 
CEO equity based compensation 0.29 
 
(0.604) 
Insider stock ownership -7.17** 
 (0.017) 
Block holder stock ownership -1.05 
 (0.766) 
Constant 104.24*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
Wald  χ2 17.11** 
Pseudo R2 0.216 
N 88 
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TABLE 6 
Post securitization effect of governance on firm risk, leverage, and value 
The table reports the coefficients from a cross-sectional regression of systematic risk (β), leverage, and firm 
value (Tobin’s q) on governance and firm control variables. β and implied leverage are defined similarly as 
in Table 3. Tobin’s q defined as (book value assets + market value equity – book value equity) / (book 
value assets). Sample includes 44 securitizers from 1985 to 2005 and 44 matched non-securitizers (based 
on industry, size, and capital ratio) for which governance data is available are from year (t-1) relative to 
securitization. Firm level data are aggregated for all banks within the same bank holding company (BHC), 
and are based on (t-1) year-end Call Reports. Governance data collected from proxy statements in the year 
prior to securitization initiation. Outside directors are not employees of the company, have no business ties 
to it, and do not sit on the board of a subsidiary. Insiders are board members employed by the BHC. Equity 
based compensation is the ratio between the value of granted options to salary, bonus and option value. 
Blockholder’s ownership is for the largest equity holder obtained from 13-F filings. Non-performing loans 
ratio defined as loans 90 days or more past due but still accruing interest plus non-accrual loans to total 
loans. Risky assets are total assets adjusted for cash, federal funds sold, and securities. p-values reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 βPOST Implied Leverage Tobin’s q 
    
Insider stock ownership 1.81 2.39 1.11 
 (0.239) (0.162) (0.250) 
CEO equity based comp.  0.26 -0.71 0.2 
 (0.199) (0.152) (0.428) 
Largest Blockholder stockownership 3.57** 5.18 2.74* 
 (0.048) (0.136) (0.098) 
Percent outside directors 0.09 0.82** -0.49** 
 (0.721) (0.042) (0.019) 
Predicted securitization probability (PSP) 0.66** 0.41 -0.16 
 (0.038) (0.559) (0.428) 
PSP* (insider stock ownership) -3.42 -9.06** -0.76 
 (0.273) (0.025) (0.696) 
PSP* (CEO Equity based comp.) -0.82* -0.24 -0.18 
 (0.057) (0.804) (0.600) 
PSP* (Largest Blockholder ownership) -4.02 -4.84 -4.78* 
 (0.335) (0.513) (0.068) 
PSP* (Percent outside directors) -0.15 -0.68 0.69** 
 (0.752) (0.385) (0.017) 
σ (non-performing loans)
 t-1 27.41*** 21.78* 0.11 
 (0.003) (0.087) (0.965) 
Ln. (total assets) 0.23*** -0.03 0.01 
 (0.000)  (0.839) (0.867) 
capital-to-risky assets -0.80 -8.18* 1.06 
 (0.708) (0.051) (0.228) 
Constant -3.30*** 3.72* 1.01*** 
 (0.000)  (0.080) (0.001) 
    
F-statistics 11.27*** 5.30*** 2.87*** 
Adjusted R2 0.4412 0.15 0.2493 
N 88 88 88 
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Appendix I 
Variable Definition Using Call Reports Data 
(as defined by Kashyap and Stein AER 2000) 
 
Variable  Definition  Call report item 
Total assets  rcfd2170 
BV equity Book value of equity rcfd3210 
Total loans Prior to 1984: (loans and leases net unearned income, 
allowance and reserves + lease finance receivables )  
From 1984: loans and leases net unearned income, allowance 
and reserves 
(rcfd2125 + rcfd2165) 
 
rcfd2125 
Liquidity ratio  (cash + fed funds sold + BV securities) / assets (rcfd0010 +rcfd1350 + rcfd0390) / 
rcfd2170 
Capital ratio BV. Equity / total assets rcfd3210 / rcfd2170 
Capital to risky 
assets 
BV. Equity / (assets - cash - fed funds sold -  BV securities) rcfd3210 / (rcfd2170 – rcfd0010 -
rcfd1350 - rcfd0390) 
ROA Net income / assets riad4340 / rcfd2170 
ROE Net income / BV equity riad4340 / rcfd3210 
Large deposits ratio (CDs above $100K + Open time deposits above $100K) / total 
deposits 
(rcon6645+rcon6646) / rcfd2200 
Non-performing 
loans ratio 
(Loans 90 days past due but still accruing interest + non-
accrual loans) / total loans 
(rcfd1407 + rcfd1403) / total loans 
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Appendix II 
First Securitization Activity by a BHC and its Respective Special Purpose Entity 
(Note: the list includes only those BHCs for which a proxy statement was available) 
Year Issuer BHC  Matched Non-Securitizer 
1985 Citibank NA Citicorp Chemical New York Corp 
1985 Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Manufacturers Hanover Corporation Bankers Trust Corp 
1987 Security Pacific National Bank Security Pacific Corporation WFC Holdings Corp 
1987 Bank Boston Cars Trust 1987-A Bank of Boston Corporation Continental Illinois Holding Corp 
1987 First Chicago Cards Tr 1987-1 First Chicago Corporation Mellon Bank Corp 
1987 MBNA Credit Card Trust 1987-A MNC Financial, Inc. Boatmens N.B. of St. Louis 
1988 Shawmut National 1988-A Shawmut Corporation Ameritrust Corp 
1988 UST Fastbacs 1988-B Grantor Tr UST Corp Summcorp 
1988 Huntington Grantor Tr 1988-A Huntington Bancshares Incorporated Michigan National Corp 
1988 J.P. Morgan Mortgage Pass-Thru J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated First Union Corp /  Wachovia 
1988 First Security 88-A Grantor Tr First Security Corporation Equitable Bancorp / Maybaco 
1988 Chase Manhattan Grantor 88-A Chase Manhattan Corporation Citizens & Southern Corp GA 
1989 Banc One Grantor Trust 1989-A Banc One Corporation First Union Virginia Corp 
1989 Valley Natl. Grantor Tr 1989-A Valley National Bancorp Associated Banc Corp 
1989 Hibernia Natl-1989-A Trust Hibernia Corporation United Banks of Colorado 
1989 Bank Of New England 1989-A Bank Of New England Corporation First Fidelity Bancorp NJ 
1990 National City Bank, Cleveland National City Corp Union Bank 
1990 Midlantic Auto Grantor Trust Midlantic Corporation Ameritrust Corp 
1990 Norwest Master Trust Norwest Corporation US Bancorp OR 
1990 Signet Credit Card Tr 1990-1 Signet Banking Corporation Comerica Inc  
1990 FBS Mortgage Corp First Bank System First City Bancorp TX 
1990 First Interstate Bank Of Ca First Interstate Bancorp First of America Bank Corp MI 
1991 Meridian Automobile Tr 1991-A Meridian Bancorp, Inc. State Street Boston Corp 
1991 BNY Master Credit Card Trust Bank of New York Company, Inc.,  UJB Financial Corp 
1991 Pittsburgh National Bank PNC Financial Corp Baybanks Inc 
1991 Velco 1991-A Grantor Trust Banponce Corporation Whitney Holding Corp 
1992 OSCC Home Equity Ln Tr 1992-1 NBB Bancorp, Inc. Trustco Bank Corp NY 
1992 Fleet Mortgage Securities Fleet Financial Group, Inc First Fidelity Bancorporation 
1993 Corestates Home Eq Trst 1993-1 Corestates Financial Corp Southtrust Corporation. 
1993 NationsBank Of Delaware NationsBank Corporation Bancorp Hawaii Inc 
1994 Society Student Loan Trust Society Corporation Firstar Bk Milwaukee Na 
1995 EQCC Home Equity Ln Tr 1995-1 Barnett Banks, Inc. Regions Financial Corp 
1995 Wachovia Cdt Cd Mstr Tr 1995-1 Wachovia Corporation Mercantile Bancorporation Inc 
1996 Fifth Third Auto Grantor Trust Fifth Third Bancorp BB&T Corp 
1996 Irwin Home Equity Corp Trust Irwin Financial Corporation First Oak Brook Bancshares Inc 
1997 Mid-State Trust Vi(Wilmington) Wilmington Trust Corp Capital One Financial Corp 
1997 Provident Bank Home Eq 1997-2 Provident Financial GRP Inc United Missouri Bancshares Inc 
1997 First Nbc Cc Mstr Trust 1997-1 First Commerce Corporation Commerce Bancshares Inc 
1997 Crestar Student Loan Tr 97-1 Crestar Financial Corporation MBNA Corporation 
1998 Union Planters Mortgage 98-1 Union Planters Corp M&T Bank Corp  
1998 Compass Bank Auto Rec 1998-A Compass Bancshares, Inc. Old Kent Financial Corporation 
1998 Greenpoint MH 1998-1 Greenpoint Financial Corp Zions Bancorp 
1999 United National Home Loan 99-1 United National Bancorp Mid America Bancorp KY 
2000 Amsouth Auto Trust 2000-1 Amsouth Bancorporation Marshall & Ilsley Corp 
2002 First Horizon Mgt 2002-Ar2 First Tennessee National Corporation BankNorth Group Inc New 
2005 SunTrust 2005-1F SunTrust Banks INC Webster Financial Corp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
124 
List of References 
 
 
 
 
Adams, R., Mehran, H., (2003). “Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Compnaies?” Rederal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review (April), 123-
142. 
Alderfer, C.P., (1986). “The Invisible Director on Corporate Boards.” Harvard Business 
Review 64, 38–52. 
Anderson, J., (2009). “Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance.” 
September 6. 
Anderson, R.C.; and D.R. Fraser (2000). “Corporate Control, Bank Risk Taking, and the 
Health of the Banking Industry.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 1383-1398. 
Ashcraft, Adam, and Til Schuermann (2008). “Understanding the Securitization of 
Subprime Mortgage Credit.” Staff Working Paper no. 318, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
Bacon, J., Brown, J.K., (1973). “Corporate Directorship Practices: Role, Selection and 
Legal Status of the Board.” The Conference Board, New York. 
Barber, M.B.; and J.D. Lyon (1997). “Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The 
Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43, 341-372. 
Bhagat, S., Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L., (1994). “The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 35, 221–247. 
Billett, M.T.; M.J. Flannery; and J.A. Garfinkel (2006). “Are Bank Loans Special? 
Evidence on the Post-Announcement Performance of Bank Borrowers.” Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41, 733-751. 
Boehmer, E.; J. Masumeci; and A.B. Poulsen (1991). “Event –Study Methodology Under 
Conditions of Event Induced Variance.” Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 
253-272. 
Benveniste, Lawrence M. and Allen N. Berger (1987). “Securitization with Recourse: An 
Instrument that Offers Uninsured Bank Depositors Sequential Claims.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 11, 403-24.   
Brown, W.O., Maloney, M.T., (1999). “Exit, Voice, and the Role of Corporate Directors: 
Evidence from Acquisition Performance.” Claremont Colleges Working Paper. 
  
125 
Bryd, J., Hickman, K., (1992). “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from 
Tender Offer Bids.” Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195–222. 
Calomiris, Charles W. (2000). U.S Bank Regulation in Historical Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Calomiris, Charles W. (2008). “The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and 
What’s Next, Working Paper, Columbia University.  
Calomiris, Charles W. (2009). “Financial Regulation, Innovation, and Reform.” The Cato 
Journal, 65-91. 
Calomiris, Charles W. (2009). “Prudential Bank Regulation: What’s Broke and How to 
Fix It.” Working paper.   
Calomiris, Charles W. and Joseph R. Mason (2004). “Credit Card Securitization and 
Regulatory Arbitrage.” Journal of Financial Services Research 26, 5-26. 
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer (1994). “The Credit Rating Industry.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 19, Summer-Fall, 1-26.  
Capiro, Gerard, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Edward J. Kane (2008). “The 2007 Meltdown 
in Securitized Assets: Searching for Lessons, Not Scapegoats.” Working Paper 
No. 4756, World Bank.  
Chen, Weitzu, Chi-Chun Liu, and Stephen G. Ryan (2008). “Characteristics of 
Securitizations that Determines Issuers’ Retention of the Risks of the Securitized 
Assets.” The Accounting Review 83, 1181-1215. 
Committee of Global Financial System (2005). “The Role of Ratings in Structured 
Finance: Issues and Implications.” http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.htm.   
Cornell, Bradford., Wayne Landsman, and Alan Shapiro (1989). “Cross-Sectional 
Regularities in the Response of Stock Prices to Bond Rating Changes.” Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 4, 460-79.  
Cornett, M.M. E. Ors, and H. Teharanian. (2002)  “Bank Performance Around the 
Introduction of a Section 20 Subsidiary.” Journal of Finance, 1, 501-521. 
Cornett M.M, ,Alan J. Marcus, A. Saunders and H. Tehranian, (2007). “The Impact of 
Institutional Ownership on Corporate Operating Performance.”  Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 31, 1771-1794. 
Dechow, Patricia M. and Catherine Shakespeare (2009). “Do Managers Time 
Securitization Transactions to Obtain Accounting Benefits?” The Accounting 
Review 84, 99-132 
  
126 
Dichev, Illia D., and Joseph D. Piotroski (2001). “The Long Run Stock Returns 
Following Bond Rating Changes.” Journal of Finance 56 (January), 173-203.  
Dunn, D.J. (1987). “Directors Aren’t Doing Their Jobs.” Fortune (March), 117–119. 
Ederington, Louis H., Jess B. Yawitz, and Brian E. Roberts (1987). “The Informational 
Content of Bond Ratings.” Journal of Financial Research 10, 211-26.  
Falkenstein, E.G., (1996). “Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual 
Fund Portfolio Holdings.” Journal of Finance 51 (March), 111–135. 
Fama, E. and K. French (1993). “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and 
Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.  
Fitch Ratings, (2009). “Off-Balance Sheet Accounting Changes.” June 22. 
Flannery, Mark J. (2001). “The Faces of Market Discipline.” Journal of Financial 
Services Research 20, 107-19. 
Franke, G. and J.P. Krahnen. (2005) “Default Risk Sharing Between Banks and Markets: 
The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations.” The Risks of Financial 
Institutions. 
Glascock, John R., Wallace N. Davidson, and Glenn V. Henderson (1987). 
“Announcement Effects of Moody’s Bond Rating Changes on Equity Returns.” 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 26, 67-78.    
Goh, Jeremy C. and Louis H. Ederington (1993). “Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad 
News, Good News, or no News for Stockholders?” Journal of Finance 48, 2001-
08. 
Golding, E., 2000. Comments on Joint Interagency Proposed Regulation entitled “Risk-
Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes: Proposed Rule; 
65 Fed. Reg. 12320. 
Gorton, Gary (2008). “The Panic of 2007”, Working Paper, Yale University.  
Gorton, G., Metrick, A., (2009). “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo.” Working 
paper, Yale School of Management. 
Gorton, Gary B., and George G. Pennacchi (1989). “Are Loan Sales Really Off-Balance 
Sheet?” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 4, 125-45. 
Gorton, Gary B., and George G. Pennacchi (1995). “Banks and Loan Sales Marketing 
Nonmarketable Assets” Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389-411. 
  
127 
Gorton, Gary, and Nicholas S. Souleles (2006). “Special Purpose Vehicles and 
Securitization”, with chapter in The Risks of Financial Institutions, edited by 
Rene Stulz and Mark Carey, University of Chicago Press.  
Greenbaum, S., Thakor, A., (1987). “Bank Funding Modes Securitization versus 
Deposits. Journal of Banking and Finance 11, 379-401. 
Greenbaum, Stuart, and Anjan Thakor (2007). Contemporary Financial Intermediation, 
Second Edition Academic Press. 
Griffin, Paul and Antonio Z. Sanvicente (1982). “Common Stock Returns and Rating 
Changes: A Methodological Comparison.” Journal of Finance 37 (March), 103-
19.   
Hamada, R. (1969). “Portfolio Analysis, Market Equilibrium, and Corporate Finance.” 
Journal of Finance, 24, 13-31. 
 
Hand, John R. M., Robert W. Holthausen, and Richard W. Leftwhich (1992). “The Effect 
of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices.” Journal of 
Finance 47 (June), 733-52.   
 
Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T., (2003). “Institutional Investors and Executive 
Compensation.” Journal of Finance 58, 2351–2374. 
 
Hansel, D. N. and J.P. Krahnen (2007) “Does Credit Securitization Reduce Bank Risk? 
Evidence from the European CDO Market.” Working Paper.  
Heckman, J. (1979) “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error” Econometrica, 47, 
153-161. 
 
Herring Richard J. (2008) “The Darker Side of Securitization: How Subprime Lending 
Led to a Systemic Crisis”, Presentation to the Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, May 4.   
Higgins, Eric and Joseph R. Mason (2004). “What is the Value of Recourse to Asset 
Backed Securities: A Study of Credit Card ABS Recourse.” journal of Banking 
and Finance 28 (April), 857-74.  
 
Hill, C.A. (1996). “Securitization: A Low Cost Sweetener for Lemons” Washington 
University Law Quarterly, 74.  
 
Hite, G.L.; J.E. Owers; and R.C. Rogers (1987). “The Market for Interfirm Asset Sales: 
Partial Sell-offs and Total Liquidations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 
229-252. 
 
Holthausen, W. Robert and Richard W. Leftwhich (1986). “The Effect of Bond Rating 
Changes on Common Stock Prices.” Journal of Financial Economics 17 57-89.   
  
128 
 
Instefjord, N. (2005). “Risk and hedging: Do Credit Derivatives Increase Bank Risk?” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 333-345. 
 
Jensen, M., (1993). “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control Systems.” Journal of Finance 48, 831–880. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
 
Kliger, Doron and Oded Sarig (2000). “The Information value of Bond Ratings”. Journal 
of Finance 6 (December), 2879-902.  
 
Kose, J.; and E. Ofek (1995). “Asset Sales and Increase in Focus.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37, 105-126. 
 
Krahnen, J.P., and C. Wilde (2006). “Risk Transfer with CDOs and Systemic Risk in 
Banking.” Working Paper. 
 
Krugman, Paul, (2008). “Partying like It’s 1929.” New York Times, March 21.  
 
Lang, L.; A. Poulsen; and R. Stulz (1995). “Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the 
Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion.” Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 3-
37. 
 
Liu, Pu, and Anjan Thakor (1984). “Interst Yields, Credit Ratings and Economics 
Characteristics of State Bonds: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 16, 344-51. 
 
Lockwood, L.J.; R.C. Rutherford; and M.J. Herrera (1996). “Wealth Effects of Asset 
Securitization.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 151-164. 
 
Lucchetti, Aaron and Serena Ng (2007). “How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled the Subprime 
Mess” The Wall Street Journal, August 15. 
 
Marra, A. F. (2000). Comments on Joint Interagency Proposed Regulation entitled, 
“Risk-Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes,” 
Comments Submitted to Regulators by Fannie Mae, June 7. 
 
Mason, Jospeh R., and Joshua Rosner (2007b). “Where Did the Risk Go? How 
Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized 
Debt Obligations Market Disruption.” Working Paper, Drexel University.  
 
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., (1990). “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and 
Corporate Value.” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595–612. 
 
  
129 
Memorandum Opinion (2001), U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
Feb. 5. 
 
Moody’s Investors Service, (2001). “True Sale Assailed: Implications of In re LTV Steel 
for Structured Transactions,” April 27. 
 
Nesbitt, S.L., (1994). Long-term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the 
‘CalPERS Effect’. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 6, 75–80. 
 
Nomura, (2002). “ABS Credit Migrations,” March 5. 
 
OCC Guidance (2002). “Interagency Guidance on Implicit Recourse in Asset 
Securitization”.  
 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2003). Interpretive Letter #988, July 28, 2003 April 2004, 12 CFR 3, 
version of July 28. 
 
Pinches, George E. and Clay J. Singleton (1978). “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to 
Bond Rating Changes.” Journal of Finance 33 (March), 29-44.  
 
Riddiough Timothy J., and Risharng Chiang (2003). “Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securities: An Exploration into Agency, Innovation, Information, and Learning in 
Financial Markets.” Mimeograph, University of Wisconsin.  
  
Robert, Schweitzer, Samuel Szewczyk S., and Raj Varma (1992). “Bond Rating Agencies 
and Their Role in Bank Market Discipline.” Journal of Financial Services 
Research 6, 249-63.  
 
Rosenthal, J.A. and J.Ocampo (1988). “Securitization of Credit.” New York, NY: Wiley. 
  
Thomas, H. (1999). “A Preliminary Look at Gains from Assets Securitization.” Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 9, 321-333. 
 
Scism, L., Smith, R., (2009). “Wall Street Wizardry Reworks Mortgages.” October 1.  
 
Smith, M., (1996). “Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS.” Journal of Finance 51, 227–252. 
 
Stigliz, Joseph, (2008). “Unfettered Market Do Not Lead to Social Well Being.” 
 
Vermilyea, Todd A., Elizabeth Webb R., and Andrew A. Kish (2008). “Implicit Recourse 
and Credit Card Securitizations: What Do Fraud Losses Reveal?” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 32, 1198-1208. 
 
  
130 
“Will Sales Treatment Survive a Recession?” (1997). Asset Sales Report, 11:13 (March 
31, 1. 
 
Wakeman, L. (1978). “Bond Rating Agencies and the Capital Markets.” Working Paper, 
University of Rochester.  
 
Weinstein, Mark I. (1977). “The Effect of a Rating Change on Bond Prices.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 5 (October), 329-50.   
 
Weisbach, M.S., (1988). “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 20, 431–460. 
 
Yermack, D., (1996). “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors.” Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185–211. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
131 
 
VITA 
 
Adi Mordel 
 
 
Experience: 
Senior Analyst, Bank of Canada 
Financial Stability Department, Regulatory Policy Division   
July, 2010 
 
 
Education: 
LeBow College of Business, Drexel University  
Ph.D., Finance, 2010  
Dissertation Title: Three Essays on Securitization  
Committee Members:  David Becher, Jacqueline Garner, Michael Gombola, Eric Higgins, 
Joseph R. Mason (Chair) 
 
College of Business Administration, Kansas State University 
M.B.A., 2005 
 
College of Business Administration, Kansas State University 
B.S., Finance, Cum Laude 2004 
 
 
Invited Talks and Conferences: 
Bar-Ilan University, European Business School, European Central Bank, University of 
Exeter, Bank of Canada, Victoria University of Wellington, the 46th annual Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition, 2010,  FMA Doctoral Consortium, 2009, FMA Special 
Ph.D. Student Paper Presentation Session, 2009, SFA Annual Meeting, 2009, FMA Annual 
Meeting, 2008, EFA Annual Meeting, 2008, Mid Atlantic Research Conference in Finance, 
2008 
 
Academic Honors: 
Graduate Assistantship, Drexel University Department of Finance, 2005-2009 
LeBow College Outstanding Ph.D. Teaching Assistant Award, Drexel University 2008 
Graduate Assistantship, Kansas State University, Department of Finance, 2004 
Adult Student Academic Excellence Award, Kansas State University, 2004 
Academic Scholarship, Kansas State University, College of Business Administration 2002-
2003 
Athletic Scholarship (NCAA Sanctioned), Kansas State University, 2000-2002 
All-Academic First Team, Big 12 Conference, 2001-2002 
 
 
  
